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Abstract: 
This study investigates how conversationalists use emotion in interaction. In analysing 
audio recordings of American English phone calls, a phenomenon labelled “claims of 
affect” was found. These are utterances which a speaker uses to claim a particular 
emotion that he or she feels at a certain point in time and is related to a certain set of 
events. Linguistically, the phenomenon is versatile in its design. However two main 
linguistic constructions have emerged. Each structure relies on copular verbs and 
affective terms. Yet pronoun use differs in each case. The first person pronoun I is 
commonly used to refer to the speaker herself whereas the third person pronoun it is 
found to function as a global reference that refers to abstract items such as events, 
situations and various circumstances. Claims can be located in “pre-cause” and “post-
cause” positions. The cause should be understood as a trigger of the emotion that the 
speaker is claiming to feel. Pre-cause claims topicalise the cause whereas post-cause 
claims elicit either an aligning or disaligning response depending on the activity the 
conversationalists are engaged in.  
 The responses of second speakers are typically empathetic. By doing an 
empathetic response second speakers claim to have access to how the claimer feels. In 
one fragment, a second speaker has been observed to deny the claimer her right to feel 
in a certain way. This suggests that one aspect of emotion is that it is a public, social 
phenomenon and not the private, psychological one that some researchers have argued. 
Conversationalists negotiate their affective lives with their conversational partners in 
order for them to confirm that their emotional response to a situation is valid. Their 
partners will therefore judge if this is so. If it is not the case, they will orient the claimer 
towards it as being an unreasonable claim. This means that they must be appropriate to 
the cause. If considered invalid the claimer faces a dispreferred response from the 
second speaker.  
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1 Introduction 
Affect has previously been thought of as private to the individual. In conversation 
analysis (CA), its role in social interaction has often either been avoided or denied. Only 
few studies have investigated the implications of emotion on social interaction (cf. 
Coulter, 1986; Couper-Kuhlen, 2007; Goodwin & Goodwin, 2000 & Wilkinson & 
Kitzinger, 2009). For example, Wilkinson and Kitzinger (2009) investigated surprise 
indicated by means of “reaction tokens” or “response tokens”. These are closely related 
to Goffman’s (1981) “response cries”. Couper-Kuhlen (2007) investigated the phonetic 
features and interactional achievement of displayed disappointment. Coulter (1986) 
found that expressing an emotion takes an object or a justification. This suggests that 
emotion and affect are social phenomena that are strongly present in interaction.  
 The research reported here is an extension of these studies. It investigates what 
conversationalists achieve interactionally when they claim to be feeling in a certain 
way. These are utterances such as: 
 
(1.1) CH:EN_4092:YUCKY:13:23* 
 
   *Ad: So (.) i'm kinda depressed about that, 
 
(1.2) CH:EN_4157:JEALOUS:09:40 
 
   *Bro: It's horrid? 
 
This phenomenon is referred to as “claims of affect” (or simply “claims”) for two 
reasons. Firstly the findings suggest that conversationalists intersubjectively orient 
towards the justifiability and validity of the claim. Secondly researchers should treat 
these claims as not necessarily being indicatory of a speaker’s actual affectivity. For 
their study, Ochs & Schieffelin (1989: 7) stated that they are not “[…] concerned with 
issues of a speakers’ actual feeling states or the extent to which their affective 
expression is genuine”. This means that the brain is taken out of the equation. Instead 
only the observable is in focus. This is an idea that goes back to ethnomethodology. As 
Garfinkel (1963: 190) says, there is nothing of interest in the brain to researchers of 
social interaction. This means that analyses of brain processes should be left to the 
neuroscientist.  
                                                
* See appendix for an explanation for cross-referencing data. 
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This paper follows Garfinkel’s recommendations and investigates the observable 
behaviour of conversationalists. What has been found is that affectivity is a public 
phenomenon that conversationalists use to achieve their conversational goals. 
Furthermore the study finds that second speakers can claim access to and even deny the 
claimer’s affectivity. Couper-Kuhlen (2007) notes that CA avoids considering the role 
of affect in interaction. However this study shows that it plays a key part and is not 
passive in interaction. Indeed it is shown that affectivity is oriented to as highly ordered 
by the conversationalists.   
 Claims of affect appear varying sequential locations where they have different 
functions. These are predominantly before and after the cause that triggers the claimed 
emotional reaction. Before the cause they are used to provide an opportunity to talk 
about the cause. After the cause they are used to seek alignment or disalignment. The 
main types of responses to claims appearing after the cause are “aligning”. In one 
instance the preferred response is “disaligning”. The second speaker may thus agree that 
the claim is appropriate or inappropriate. It is the norm to provide an opportunity for a 
claims production when it is produced before the cause has been presented.  
 “Stance” implies a speaker’s orientation towards something. Increasing interest 
has been given to the interactional properties of stance by researchers grounded in 
interactional linguistics and CA (see for example Du Bois 2007; Haddington, 2011; 
Kärkkäinen, 2006; Niemelä, 2005; Selting, 2010). The present study sees stance as 
inherent in the individual utterance and a potential asset of the a larger activity when it 
is elicited through interaction (Haddington 2004). It is expressed through the linguistic 
design of turns-at-talk that underlies conversational actions. This is somewhat dissimilar 
to the view of stance that Du Bois (2007) proposes. He argues that it is similar to what 
has been known as an action in CA. By taking this approach to stance, the present study 
situates itself amongst other research on stance from an interactional point of view. 
Claims of affect are here seen as a type of stance in that they convey a speaker’s 
affective orientation and response towards a given circumstance. However claims of 
affect are also argued to be a conversational action in the CA sense. Yet they contain a 
stance valenced negatively towards something. These are typically used when a 
conversationalist claims a certain state of affairs is wrong. Thus, they are common in 
complaint sequences and troubles tellings.  
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In sum, this investigation analyses the phenomenon claims of affect, their sequential 
location and what their functions are. This has implications for how researchers view 
affect, feelings and emotion and their relation to interaction.  
 Chapter 2 accounts for methodology. It will account for the data, how it has 
been treated, transcribed and analysed. A brief overview will be given of CA 
methodology.  In chapter 3, relevant studies are reported to contextualise the study. It is 
divided into two sections. One accounts for research on stance and CA. The other 
reviews affect in relation to stance and sequential organisation. Chapter 4 provides a 
linguistic analysis of claims of affect. The focus of the analysis is on lexical choices and 
grammatical constructions. Chapter 5 analyses the functions of claim of affect. It 
investigates the sequential environment in which claims occur, the response they 
receive and what they achieve interactionally. Chapter 6 concludes the study and points 
towards further research.  
2 Methodology 
This chapter provides an overview of the investigated data, its treatment and methods 
by which it has been selected and analysed. The corpora this study utilises are 
CallHome (CH) (Canavan, Graff, & Zipperlen, 1997) and CallFriend (CF) (Canavan & 
Zipperlen, 1996). A research group based at the University of Pennsylvania recorded 
them for speech recognition purposes. The CH corpus is comprised of 120 phone calls 
ca. 30-minute recordings of American English phone calls. 90 were made to Americans 
living abroad whereas 30 were made domestically. The relationship between the 
speakers is either family or close friends. In all, the CF corpus contains 60 recordings of 
varying length. It contains only calls made domestically with speakers speaking with a 
Southern American English dialect. More information is available on the 
conversationalists such as age, gender, occupation and education. The only fragments 
that have been examined for this study are those available through the TalkBank Project 
(MacWhinney, 2007).  
 By listening to the phone calls, certain conversational events evoked interest. 
These were when conversationalists announce that they feel in a certain way with words 
such as depressed or happy. Additionally they use copular verbs such as to feel, to get 
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or to be. In these sentences they would refer to themselves using the first person 
singular pronoun I. These turns at talk have the following format. 
 
 [First person singular pronoun] + [copula verb] + [affective term] 
 
They occur in “complaint sequences” (Drew, 2011) and “troubles-talk” (Jefferson, 
1988). Complaint sequences in which a conversationalist implements a set of moral 
rules to evaluate someone’s or the speaker’s own conduct as being proper or improper 
(Drew, 2011: 296). Jefferson (1988) argues that sequences in which conversationalists 
talk about their troubles are ordered at the sequential level. These are definitions that 
will also be applied in the present study.  
 Sequentially the format indicated above would either appear before or after the 
source of the trouble or the reason for the complaint. During the course of examining 
more and more data, another linguistic format was found in the same positions. The 
defining feature of this format is the third person singular pronoun it being the subject 
of the sentence. This is followed by the copular to be and an affective term. This is 
typically an adjective. This establishes the following formats. 
 
 [First person singular pronoun] +[copula] + [affective term] 
 
 [Third person singular pronoun] + [copula] + [affective term] 
 
These formats are basic for doing claims of affect. Yet they do have variations. For 
example, a noun phrase such what a mess can act affectively. Others rely on inference. 
This will be shown in section 4.4. 
 Searching the corpora for these formats and their sequential positions in 
conversation grew a data collection large enough to generalise over and thereby find 
and establish the interactional function of producing a reference to an emotional state 
and thus doing a claim of affect. The collection of claims is mainly comprised of 
women speaking. In one fragment, a woman and a man are speaking. Only one 
conversation has men exclusively.  
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After data segments had been selected, they were transcribed. This was done using 
some of the conventions of GAT 2 (Selting et al., 2009) and added conventions†. After 
transcription the fragment is analysed in the CA tradition. Presenting all the aspects of 
CA is a task that cannot be done here and neither is it the purpose of this paper to give 
an in-depth account of an already well-established method. Therefore only core 
concepts and ideas will be accounted for.  
 CA is rooted in lectures given by sociologist Harvey Sacks (1935-75) UCLA 
from 1964-68 (see Sacks, 1992) and a number of articles Sacks co-authored with Gail 
Jefferson (1938-2008) and Emanuel A. Schegloff (1937-) (see for example Jefferson, 
Schegloff & Sacks, 1987; Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974). In CA tradition, 
language use is seen as an organised and systematic conduct. One of the most basic 
constructions in interaction is the “adjacency pair”. For interaction to be successful 
there must be a “first pair part” (FPP) and “second pair part” (SPP). These can be 
expanded in a number of ways. These expansions depend on the sequence type and the 
conversationalists’ agenda. Typical expansions are “pre-expansions”, “insert-
expansions” and “post-expansions” (Schegloff, 2007). Adjacency pairs and expansions 
are the building blocks of conversation. What they do in conversation is related to the 
concept of “action”. Each turn at talk is designed to do something conversationally such 
as agreeing or disagreeing (aligning and disaligning) or complaining, accusing, 
requesting and so on.  
 Each action proffers a projected trajectory in the conversation. In other words 
each action demands a certain type of response. This relation is commonly referred to as 
“preference organisation” (Pomerantz, 1984; Sacks, 1987; Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks 
1977). For example, rules and preference have been observed to apply for doing repairs 
on prior talk. A distinction is made here between “self-initiated repair” and “other-
initiated repair”. The first is preferred whereas the latter is not. Pomerantz (1984) 
investigated assessments and responses. Self-deprecating assessments by first speakers 
prefer disalignment by second speakers. This is because conversationalists do not want 
their self-deprecations confirmed. The concepts of disalignment and alignment imply 
the nature of a second speaker’s agreement to the first speaker’s turn.  
                                                
† See definitions for an overview of conventions. 
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The analysis of a second speakers response to a first speakers turn is a powerful one in 
conversation analysis commonly referred to as the “next turn proof procedure” (Sacks, 
Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974). This tool allows the analyst to access the 
conversationalists’ understanding of the previous turn. So when a conversationalist is 
making a request, it is only analysable as a request if the second speaker treats it as 
such. The authors describe this as follows: 
 
“When A addresses a first pair-part such as a 'question' or a 'complaint' 
to B, we have noted, A selects B as next speaker, and selects for B that 
he next perform a second part for the 'adjacency pair' A has started, 
i.e. an 'answer' or an ‘apology' (among other possibilities) 
respectively. B, in so doing, not only performs that utterance-type, but 
thereby displays (in the first place to his co-participants) his 
understanding of the prior turn's talk as a first part, as a 'question' or 
'complaint'.” (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974: 728) 
 
In producing a SPP, a second speaker makes his or her understanding of the first 
speaker’s turn available to the first speaker (as well as the researcher listening in on the 
conversation).  
 The advantage of taking the CA approach to analyse conversational data is that 
it provides the researcher with strong analytical tools to investigate what words achieve 
in interaction (Pomerantz & Fehr, 1997). The approach assumes that conversation is an 
orderly conduct governed by actions and rules where each turn-at-talk has implications 
for the next and conversationalists orient each other to the activity they are engaged in.  
 Another advantage is that CA researchers assume only certain technical a priori 
categories such as TCUs and adjacency pairs as described above. Otherwise categories 
are only founded based on what speakers orient to. This means that conversational 
conduct is defined based on “the reality of the participants” and not preconceived 
theories (Schegloff, 1996: 172). Instead the analyst develops categories based on what 
is relevant to the speakers themselves in the moment of talking by reference to the next 
turn proof procedure. Each turn is therefore always considered in relation to the next 
and never in isolation. This is because language is always assumed by researchers to be 
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contextually realised. CA as a method is inductive rather than theoretical and 
philosophical.  
3 Research on affect and stance in interaction 
To situate this study within the academic context and account for key terminology, this 
chapter reports on research into “affect” and “stance” as they appear in conversation in 
order to arrive at a definition of what linguistic and interactional levels they apply to. 
The key concepts stance and affect overlap. Many researchers argue that affect is a 
component of stance which this study will argue. This chapter will also argue that both 
affect and stance is present in individual turns and can be individual turns.   
 The chapter is divided into the following sections. Section 3.1 reports on stance 
research, its function in conversational sequences. Section 3.2 reports research on affect 
in interaction and its relation to affect and how affect can become sequentially 
significant. As this study is a CA study primarily, the bulk of the research reported here 
comes from interactional research traditions. Section 3.3 concludes the chapter by 
arguing that affect and stance are closely related.  
3.1 Stance in interaction 
This section seeks to define stance as a conversational “activity” and a significant 
feature of linguistic design. The section will ultimately arrive at a clear distinction 
between “activity” and “action”. This distinction will be made from a CA perspective 
by focusing on sequential organisation.  
 Stance is traditionally defined as the linguistic manifestation of a language 
user’s attitude (Biber & Finegan, 1989). It is commonly divided into three categories 
which indicate the type speaker’s attitude. These are “affective stance”, “evaluative 
stance” and “epistemic stance”. Affective stance is defined by Ochs and Schieffelin 
(1989: 7) as the linguistic realisation of a speakers “feelings, moods, dispositions and 
attitudes associated with a persons and/or situations”. An example of this is endearing 
nicknames. Epistemic stance is the linguistic expression of a speaker’s attitude towards 
some piece of knowledge such as the evidence the language user has for making some 
claim (Chafe, 1986). The verb to think is an example of this. Evaluative stance is 
achieved when a language user is assigning value to something along a dimensions such 
as “desirability” and “inclination” (Lemke, 1998). An example of this is to evaluate a 
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cake as being delicious. Biber et al. (1999) complicate matter further by claiming that 
evaluative stance and affective stance are both part of an enveloping “attitudinal 
stance”. They also propose “style of speaking stance” as a type. This type describes the 
speaker’s attitude towards the conversational activity he or she is engaged in.  
 As it can clearly be seen, stance categories vary in number. This is due to the 
fact that in many cases they overlap. This is particularly relevant when it comes to the 
collapsing of evaluative and affective into one attitudinal stance. Du Bois (2007: 145) 
notes that a definite number of stance categories and criteria for these have yet to be 
achieved. Du Bois’ argues for an alternative approach to stance which is grounded in 
“dialogicality”, “intersubjectivity” and “actions” instead of a priori defined categories. 
Dialogicality refers to the interactional aspect of language in use where one turn at talk 
follows the other with implications for the next. Intersubjectivity is the meeting ground 
between two conversationalists’ subjectivities. A conversationalist can achieve this by 
making her own views linguistically explicit in a conversation. Stance is seen by Du 
Bois (2007) and Du Bois Kärkkäinen (2012) as an “act” in the sense that it requires 
three actions to be achieved. First the stance taker performs an “evaluation” of a “stance 
object”. This may be a thing, a person or even a prior stance. Secondly the stance taker 
(or subject) “positions” a subject (herself or someone else) in relation to the object. 
Finally the stance taker may respond to a prior stance and can perform “alignment” with 
a prior stance which can quite simply be defined as a matching of stances. This and the 
subjects that interactionally achieve stance when they position themselves and each 
other towards some object of interest are what make up the three sides of Du Bois’ 
(2007) stance triangle.  
 When Du Bois (2007) and Du Bois and Kärkkäinen (2012) consider evaluation 
to be an aspect of stance, this is not to be confused with the evaluative stance as 
mentioned previously. Evaluation is not understood as assigning value to an object. 
Rather, it implies a particular orientation towards an object. Thus an evaluation can be 
“affective” in the sense that a stance taker can evaluate the stance object as having an 
affective aspect for her. For example, an utterance such as it’s depressing is affective.  
However, this is due to the affective evaluation of it. This will be additionally 
highlighted in the next chapter. 
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As is evident from Du Bois (2007) and Du Bois and Kärkkäinen (2012), the 
interactional aspects of stance or what they refer to as dialogicality and intersubjectivity 
are important components. Kockelman (2004) notes that one of the tendencies in 
present stance research is to consider stance not as a subjective phenomenon. Rather it 
is instead intersubjective. This view is supported by research in CA (cf. Goodwin, 1986; 
Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987; Pomerantz, 1984). For example, conversationalists 
partaking in assessment activities produce adjacency pairs consisting of first and second 
assessments. A conversationalist may assess that the weather is beautiful today. The 
second speaker aligns to the assessment by doing a second assessment: it’s amazing. 
Here, the first speaker takes a positive stance towards the weather by assessing it as 
being beautiful. The second speaker joins in by responding with a second assessment 
upgrading the initial assessment by utilising an upgraded assessment term (Pomerantz, 
1984). By doing this, the second speaker aligns with the first speaker. Also the second 
assessment is made dialogically relevant by the production of a first assessment. The 
assessment pairs bring the subjectivities together in what can be referred to as the 
“stance field” (Du Bois, 2007; Du Bois & Kärkkäinen, 2012). This is a public space a 
stance taker enters when he or she presents a stance to another conversationalist’s 
subjectivity. It becomes intersubjective when the second speaker takes a second stance 
towards it.  
 Intersubjectivity, dialogicality and stance lead into the domain of CA. There 
are fundamental differences between assumptions made in research on stance and 
research done in CA. This is especially evident with the notion of action. As it has 
already been reported partly in the methodology, CA assumes that conversation is 
conventionalised and that interlocutors orient themselves and each other towards this 
fact when they interact (Schegloff & Sacks, 1969). Schegloff (1972) argues that one 
utterance can be dependent on and required by the production of another utterance. If 
this does not happen it is noticeably missing from the interaction.  
 What makes this system possible is that second speakers recognise what a first 
speaker is doing in a FPP. The second speaker displays this by producing a relevant 
SPP. This means that she displays an orientation towards what the FPP is designed to 
achieve. This can be anything from a “greeting” to a “request”. The amount of actions 
found by conversation analysts is high. Yetm ore importantly these actions are not the 
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result of preconceived categories. Rather the conversationalists themselves orient 
towards them as being “greetings” and “requests”. These findings are made possible by 
the inductive tradition of CA. Obviously conversationalists do not restrict themselves to 
simply FPPs and SPPs. These can be expanded in multiple ways and thus construct 
larger sequences of occurring talk (Schegloff, 2007).  
 These sequences make up larger conversational activities. Activities are 
constructed of sequences of actions (Heritage and Sorjonen, 1994: 4). These can be 
anything from buying a beer in a pub to inviting someone out for dinner. These larger 
activities are basically what individual actions are used for doing.  
  However, some questions need answering. Where does stance belong in the 
conversational system and is it sequentially relevant? Is it a conversational action or is it 
an activity managed across turns? The solution to these questions hinge on whether 
conversationalists orient to stance as an action in the CA sense. One will have to 
investigate second speaker replies to a FPP with stance. Haddington (2004) argues for 
an approach to stance comprised of Du Bois’ theory and CA. He argues that individual 
conversational actions constitute stance as an activity. By taking this view Haddington 
supports the view of conversational activities advocated by Heritage & Sorjonen (1994). 
However, Haddington (2004) does not argue that stance is exclusively an activity. 
Rather he argues that stance belongs to individual TCUs. This is at least to the degree 
that certain markers of individual turns can imply stance. When stance becomes an 
activity, the stance implied by individual turn can be brought forward and negotiated. 
The difference between stance and action is fundamental to both Du Bois’ (2007) theory 
and CA. Haddington (2004: 116) explains this difference as follows: 
 
“In CA an action is first and foremost defined in relation to what an utterance 
is doing (a question, an assessment, an agreement, etc.) and moreover, what the 
co-participants understand an utterance to be doing. […] [W]hen we describe a 
stance (and consequently stance taking) it is necessary to pay attention to the 
“content” of the utterance, i.e. the stance that is indexed by the linguistic 
practices in the utterance and the Stance Object in the stance triangle […]” 
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This quote explains the difference between stance and action. Stance is explicit in the 
individual TCU’s linguistic components and action describes what a TCU achieves 
interactionally and sequentially in a conversation.  
 Haddington shows how stance can become an activity by analysing newsroom 
interviews. He shows that the interviewer interprets a stance implied by turn design. 
This turn is intended to do a certain action. Yet the interviewer picks up on the implied 
stance and does therefore not follow the projected course of events. Additionally, he 
shows how an interviewer in a question/answer-sequence may propose a stance for the 
interviewee to either align or disalign to. In this analysis it is clear that stance has 
sequential significance. Haddington establishes stance taking as an activity in the 
traditional CA view of activities. The stance is drawn from the individual turn and 
becomes negotiated in an activity.  
 “Challenges” also orient to a prior stance. For example, Keisanen (2006, 2007: 
255) argues that interlocutors in English face-to-face conversations can bring “[…] into 
question a claim or position embedded in the prior turn […]” by utilising negative 
yes/no questions and tag questions and thereby do challenges to these stances. What 
Keisanen also found was that these challenges interrupt the ongoing or projected 
activity. Additionally, challenges can be used for questioning the validity of some 
conversational action such as complaining for example.  
 Keisanen’s study shows that conversationalists orienting each other towards 
stance as something inherent in the prior turn at talk and challenging that view will 
cancel previous actions.  
 Based on the reporting of this research, it was argued that stance is both 
inherent in the individual turn at talk and may be brought forward by second speakers 
for it to become a stance activity such as Haddington (2004) argues. Stance and action 
are two fundamentally different phenomena that apply to different aspects of language 
in interaction. Action refers to what a turn at talk does. Stance refers to linguistic 
content and the display of speaker orientation and attitude.  
3.2 Affect, stance and interaction 
Having successfully accounted for the role of stance in interaction and its relation to 
action and activity, this section accounts the role of affect and the different levels of 
interaction that it attains to. It will be argued that affect is a feature of stance. It can 
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therefore become an activity and be sequentially implicative. These are ideas that will 
also be supported in the remainder of this paper.  
 Only few studies in CA have considered the interactional features of affect. As 
mentioned in the introduction, this is due to a methodological assumption that originates 
from Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology (cf. Garfinkel, 1963). Where Garfinkel alienates 
the brain, Heritage (2008: 303)  argues that the rules governing conversational practice 
do not rely on “[…] the motivational, psychological, or sociological characteristics of 
the participants”. Conversation can be thought of as a machine. It works independently 
from these unobservable parts of the human psyche. This has led to a reluctance within 
CA to consider the potential interactional role of affect as Couper-Kuhlen (2007) notes. 
This is because a researcher cannot observe the inner workings of human beings’ 
private emotions as noted by Du Bois & Kärkkäinen (2012: 434). However this 
assumption relies on the location of affectivity. The question is whether it is a product 
of processes in the brain or whether it is manifested in the social reality. The first is 
practically unobservable by conversation analysts. Yet they have an advantage if it is a 
social construct. If this is the case then it can be analysed by reference to linguistic 
characteristics and without any reference to internal brain processes.  
 For example, Coulter (1986) showed that conversationalists orient towards 
affectivity and especially when it seems misplaced or inappropriate. In these cases the 
conversationalists will look for the causes of the emotion. Thus Coulter concludes that 
affect must always have an object which implies the justification or cause. His findings 
were based on analysis of interactions between a patient diagnosed with hebephrenic 
schizophrenia (disorganised schizophrenia), her mother and two mental health workers. 
The patient would do various emotional displays such as laughing and crying seemingly 
out of sync with the ongoing talk. When presented with these displays, the other 
interlocutors would try to locate the cause of these displays.  
 Although not originating from CA, the concept of affective displays relates in 
part to Goffman’s (1981) notion of “response cries”. These vocalisations are according 
to Goffman instances of emotion flooding out, overcoming and catching the speaker 
unprepared. Examples are for example oops and ouch. Thus they carry some indication 
of the emotional state of the speaker producing it. Response cries have been 
investigated by a number of researchers in CA. Here they are more commonly referred 
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to as “tokens” (Heritage, 1984). Goodwin and Goodwin (2000) investigated these types 
of displays in conjunction with assessments in two very different contexts to show how 
they are sequentially organised. The first is a Spanish-English bilingual context with 
schoolgirls playing hopscotch. The second is that of an elderly severely aphasic man 
interacting with his family. In both instances the linguistic features of the vocalisations 
are interpretable as carrying emotional content. According to Goodwin and Goodwin, 
the response cries convey remarkability about something in a positive or negative way 
such as being presented with a beautiful picture or someone breaking the rules of 
hopscotch.  
 Many of the utterances that the researchers interpret as conveying emotion 
contain paralinguistic features that are claimed to display “heightened involvement”. 
Selting (1994) describes this change in speech-style as being realised by pitch, 
amplitude, voice quality and delays. However these features alone do not convey 
emotion. Rather they have to be situated and uttered in the correct sequential position. 
Selting found these features in naturally occurring speech and found that these cues are 
used to mark developments in conversational activities for example arriving at a story 
climax. The findings of these studies support the assumption that conversationalists by 
using linguistic cues to orient each other to the noteworthiness of something in their 
conversation or in their immediate setting. This is stance at work in the sense that the 
speakers make explicit what can be interpreted as their attitude towards an object of 
interest. As stated this may be something in the conversation or the surrounding context. 
 Wilkinson & Kitzinger (2009) investigated the sequential organisation of 
surprise tokens. It is used to indicate that the propositional content of her just prior turn 
was unexpected. These tokens are for example “wow”, “gee”, “gosh”, etc. It is also 
interesting that some of the linguistic design of the turns preceding the surprise token is 
designed to elicit these. Eliciting a surprise reaction can be achieved by doing 
conversational work prior to the turn that is meant to ultimately cause it. For example, it 
is arguable that starting a news telling with a pre-expansion such as are you sitting 
down before producing the FPP containing the news I’m pregnant will elicit a surprise 
token such as oh my god. Their study shows that conversationalists orient to the surprise 
worthiness of news. This means that they will orient each other towards this fact by 
eliciting and responding appropriately to meet this end.  
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Couper-Kuhlen (2007, 2012) investigates displays of disappointment. She uses data 
from British English everyday conversations to analyse their sequential distribution. 
She found that a first speaker deploys a display of disappointment as responses to a 
second speaker’s rejection of her request or invitation. The display functions as an 
acceptance of the rejection and is made with “subdued” voicing. This is characterised 
by articulatory characteristics such as breathy voice, weak articulation and low falling 
pitch. Sometimes there may (instead of a display of disappointment) be “post-rejection 
silences” or “weak agreement tokens”. These displays often result in the rejecting 
conversationalist attempting to reconcile or account for their rejection. Affect is 
especially evident when the proposing party indicates that the rejection is unacceptable.  
 Important to all these studies on response tokens is that they are interactionally 
achieved. This means that they are not the result of speaker subjectivity. Rather they 
come into being in the intersubjective meeting ground between the two. Also they show 
the conversationalists orienting each other towards the immediate context of the 
conversation. This idea is related to Chafe's (1994) “immediate mode” and “displaced 
mode” of conversation. The immediate mode refers to the capacity for orienting towards 
the immediate unfolding context. Thus it simply concerns what is experienced at the 
moment of speaking. In opposition the displaced mode moves the experience to the 
past. Golato (2012) argues that displays such as response cries are founded in the 
immediacy of the conversation. Golato compares the German oh with the German ach 
and the English oh which are in some instances used as a “change-of-state token” 
(Heritage, 1984). These are usually interpreted as marking a change in the producer’s 
state of knowledge and are thus interpreted as displaying an epistemic stance rather than 
an affective one. German oh is different from these in that it can also function as an 
affective display while being a change-of-state token. Golato (2012) argues that these 
affective displays convey speaker’s stance towards the prior utterance. Golato also 
argues as Couper-Kuhlen (2007) also does that prosody and especially intonation are 
important assets for conveying specific types of affective states. However it is also 
suggested that different intonation contours may be used to manage sequences and not 
only be conveying affect. 
 This is an important point to note as it questions the exact function of prosody 
when it comes to sequential organisation and affect. Prosody may be seen as tool for 
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managing the sequential organisation and just emotion (Local & Walker, 2008; Ogden, 
2006). Thus a linguistic display that may be interpretable as displaying disappointment 
may in fact be achieving some other conversational goal. Researchers should instead 
look to how second speakers respond to such interpretable displays. The question of the 
function of prosody as either conveying affect or managing the sequential organisation 
is not necessarily a question of one or the other. It may be that they are interwoven. It is 
a methodological problem that something can be sequentially implicative exclusively 
based on linguistic design regardless of speaker intention, affect and orientation to the 
conversation. The question boils down to whether or not interaction and the sequential 
organisation of interaction are vessels for or the result of internal psychological 
mechanisms. Enfield & Levinson (2006: 15) point out that “[t]he ability to recognize 
others’ states of mind, whether attentional or volitional and to share these states of mind 
through mutual focus in the ongoing course of interaction, is indispensable to human 
sociality”. They argue that interaction is partly grounded in the psychological and 
cognitional capacity for attending to the states of minds of others and self. The same 
idea is supported by Du Bois and Kärkkäinen (2012: 434) who underline the importance 
of acknowledging that “[…] the reality that emotion is in principle present in 
interaction, at least as a potentiality via its projectable consequences on many levels”. 
This implies that affect is fuel in the engine that comprises social interaction. As already 
accounted for, this is contrary to the view advocated by Heritage (2008) and common to 
CA. Interaction is in CA seen as structured practices facilitating the linguistic 
manifestation of affect rather than interactional practices being the result of internal and 
private psychological states.  
 Returning to Coulter (1986) may provide a solution to this problem. He argued 
that emotion always takes an object which is the source of the emotion. Prior to Coulter, 
Hochschild (1979, 1983) argued that adult emotion is highly ordered and contextually 
salient. This is due to emotion being dependent to what she characterises as “emotion 
rules” and “emotion work”. Working on an emotion implies shaping and managing it to 
fit a situation. Feeling rules apply to a person’s right/justification for feeling in a certain 
way in a certain situation. Emotions are variable to different contexts. Certain situations 
call or do not call for various emotions. This implies that emotions are seen as 
appropriate to the cause. 
19 
This idea has consequences for the assumption that all emotion is private and a product 
of biological processes in the brain. Rather it suggests that affectivity is a social 
phenomenon. Indeed much of the research reported here can be argued to support affect 
as a social act and something conversationalists can be held accountable for and orient 
each other towards. For example conversationalists convey that their conversational 
partner should display surprise when presented with some information. Thus the 
speaker will express her stance by linguistic means to interactionally evoke a display of 
affect.  
 The CA studies reported here indicate that affectivity can be achieved and 
oriented to at the linguistic level. The studies have also shown that affectivity is socially 
structured. It may be hypothesised that language plays a large part in making this 
happen. The advantage of being able to make public one’s affectivity may be profound. 
It can allow the speaker to impose an agenda. This study extends the notion of affective 
displays to claims of affect which are made in order to achieve a conversational goal. In 
other words, they display the speaker’s affective orientation to the conversation by 
means of both the immediate and displaced modes of talking (Chafe, 1994).  
3.3 Preliminary conclusion 
This chapter reviewed prior research on stance and affect. Affect was argued to belong 
to stance as a subcomponent that makes itself explicit when conversationalists display 
an affective orientation towards some set of circumstances. This is for example evident 
when conversationalists do a surprise response token (Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2009) or 
convey disappointment due to rejection of a proposition (Couper-Kuhlen, 2007, 2012). 
Affect was also argued not to be a phenomenon of the brain but a social construction 
realised by linguistic means. Stance and action were argued to apply to different areas 
of language in use. Stance has to do with the content of the utterance and what linguistic 
choices have been made to convey the speaker’s affective or epistemic attitude 
(Haddington, 2004). Action on the other hand refers what an utterance is designed to 
achieve in a conversation. Thus an utterance can be used to make a rejection to a 
proposition or invitation and thereby achieve a conversational goal. Stance may be 
present in interaction. However it is never an action in the CA sense. Rather it can 
become an activity where conversationalists intersubjectively negotiate and challenge 
stances over multiple turns of speech that can be observed in news interviews.  
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4 The linguistic formats of claims of affect 
This chapter describes the linguistic formats claims of affect in conversation. The 
following two formats account for the main types of claims  
 
[I] +[to be, to get or to feel] + [affective term] 
 
[It] + [to be] + [affective term] 
 
These two variations are shown in the fragments below. However they can occur with 
variation as will be shown on the following pages. 
 
(4.1) CH:EN_5907:SO_TIRED:01:25 
 
   *Han: O:h i think i'm dePRESSed. 
 
(4.2) CH:EN_4157:SO_JEALOUS:09:40 
 
   *Bro: It's horrid? 
 
In these two utterances, a claim is being made about the way the interlocutors feel about 
something. The term claim of affect is used to refer to the action of claiming to feel in a 
certain way. This chapter will show how this is done by linguistic means. The next 
chapter will show what implications this has sequentially. In fragment 1 Hannah claims 
to be depressed due to some set of circumstances which are not referred to in the claim 
itself. In fragment 2 Brooke perceives something, which is referred to as “it”, as being 
horrid. In both fragments a negative affective term is being used to convey an affective 
state. This is most clear in fragment 1 where fragment 2 will rely on more descriptive 
work to prove this claim.  
 In order to provide a thorough description of claims of affect, this chapter is 
structured as follows. Section 4.1 examines reference with regards to the pronouns it 
and I. Section 4.2 investigates temporality, copula use and meaning. Section 4.3 
analyses the subject complement. In section 4.4 additional structures are analysed and 
discussed as a candidates for claims of affect. This is to stress that claims of affect may 
linguistically be realised in a number of ways. Ultimately section 3.5 concludes the 
chapter. 
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4.1 Referential properties 
Formats utilising the pronoun I are referentially the most straightforward. This pronoun 
indicates the speaker as the owner of the claim. This can be seen in the following two 
fragments. 
 
(4.1.1) CH:EN_4092:YUCKY:13:23 
 
    *Ad: So (.) i'm kinda depressed about that, 
(4.1.2) CH:EN_4157:JEALOUS:09:02 
 
    *Bro: Oh my wa:ve must have struck early then because 
everybody i know is married or getting married and i'm 
(.) SO jealous. 
 
In each case the speaker refers to herself with the first person singular pronoun I and 
establishes herself as the owner of the affective state. As simple as structure A is in 
terms of referential pronouns, structure B relies on intricate referential properties.  
 
(4.1.3) CH:EN_4556:STINKY:05:26 
 
    *Amy: <<f> But it's STINky.> 
 
(4.1.4) CH:EN_4556:STINKY:07:13 
 
    *Pat: It has (.) bee:n  
  (0.2)  
    *Amy: (M[:)  
    *Pat:   [horrific. 
 
This format resembles post-positioned assessments. These are produced after an 
assessable item (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987: 20). In assessments the pronoun it is used 
anaphorically to refer to the assessable. With claims of affect it can be argued that the 
pronoun it is referentially “empty” (Crystal, 2008: 168). This means that there are no 
obvious referents. This is a grammatical function of English as a Germanic language 
that demand a grammatical subject (König, 1994). However with claims of affect this 
pronoun behaves differently here. To show that the pronoun it is what is here called a 
“global reference”, fragment 3 is expanded below.  
 
(4.1.5) CH:EN_4556:STINKY:03:13 
 
82  *Pat: °h <<all> I haven't seen june.> How is june doing?  
83  *Amy: Oh i just TAlked to her. She had another setback about  
84      (.) two weeks ago. She had a small stroke.   
  […]   
178 *Amy: It wasn't until the end that (.) that judy  
179     (0.5)  
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180     wasn't  
181     (0.3) 
182     so well ( ) wasn't feeling so well again?  
183     (0.9)  
184 *Pat: U:[ah     ]  
185 *Amy:   [<f>But] it's stinky.> 
 
It is the function of the global reference to refer to large and abstract referents such as 
situations, circumstances and events. It is not possible to locate a single referent in these 
cases. In lines 178-82, Amy is concluding her narrative by stating Judy has not been 
feeling so well again. Patricia produces u:ah in line 184 which can be interpreted as 
displaying sympathy with Judy. Overlapping Patricia’s turn, Amy produces a claim of 
affect using the pronoun it. It could be that it refers back to lines 178-82 immediately 
prior. Yet there is no clear referent here either. Also Amy’s use of the disjunctive 
conjunction indicates incoherence between the prior and subsequent. Thus the utterance 
can be interpreted not as claiming that it is stinky that June is not feeling well. Rather it 
is stinky having a friend with cancer and going through this with her. It is a larger and 
more abstract referent which the pronoun is used to refer to.  
 Another similar case is Patricia producing a narrative about a friend’s serious 
bike accident. She does a claim of affect in line 266 in a juxtaposed sentence.  
 
(4.1.6) CH:EN_4556:STINKY:06:30 
 
231 *Pat: But  
232     (0.3)  
233     The (.) they they don't know if it was a bad bike  
234  accident or  
235     (0.4)  
236     major stroke (.) th[at (.) crea]ted the bike  
237 *Amy:               [Uh      huh]  
238 *Pat: But  [he  ] is  
239 *Amy:      [yeah]  
240     (0.2)  
241 *Pat Ah he nearly died. We- we've spent a lot of time  
242  there, He was  
  […] 
256 *Pat: But he's PAralysed on one [side and he's]  
257 *Amy:                     [O:h [(.)   go]::d.  
258     (0.2)  
259 *Pat: bli (.) half blin[d and then he's]  
260 *Amy:      [O:h            ] what a shame.=  
261 *Pat: =<<f> And>  [so that>   ]  
262 *Amy:       [Is he about] (.) tim's age?  
263     (0.4)  
264 *Pat: <<f> Yea[h> a]nd it i mean he's (.) REALly a very  
265 *Amy:         [Yeah]  
266 *Pat: good friend and it'[s been hor]rible. 
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Patricia does an assessment and a claim of affect in two juxtaposed sentences in lines 
264-66. First she characterises her friend as really a very good friend. The claim itself is 
it’s been horrible. The fact that Patricia has been greatly involved justifies her being 
affected by it and it is the entire involvement, experience and accident which she claims 
to be horrible. Additional evidence can be found prior where she uses multiple 
formulations such as bad bike accident, major stroke and nearly died. These are 
“extreme case formulations” (Pomerantz, 1986). She also says, we’ve spent a lot of time 
there (line 245). This assumes that she and whoever else inferred by the pronoun we 
have been involved. The assessment she does in line 264 is also particularly interesting 
syntactically with regards to the placement of the adverb really. The question is exactly 
what this is modifying. Possibly it modifies the noun friend. By doing this she upgrades 
it. It may also be that it modifies the entire sentence. Both are equally plausible 
interpretations as it is not clearly deducible with the production what it is modifying. 
However it can be noted that Patricia by using this upgrade and others such as a very 
good friend, she indicates that she is closely involved with this man. Thus she 
underlines her justifiability for being emotionally engaged.  
 In sum this section has found that two types of pronouns are used in taking a 
stance. Use of the first person pronoun attributes the stance directly to its stance taker. 
The third person singular pronoun it is used as global reference that refers to larger and 
more abstract referents such as events, circumstances and situations.  
4.2 Verb meaning and temporality 
Having successfully analysed the referential properties of pronouns used for creating 
claims of affect, the present section will discuss how verbs are used to create a link 
between the subject and the predicate adjective which in claims of affect are affective 
terms. The three main verbs found in the data are to be, to feel and to get. Although 
these are copulas with slightly different meanings, the main function of the copula is: 
 
“[…] to link a subject with a predicate that cannot carry tense and agreement 
morphology. This verb is a copula (from the Latin copulare ‘to link’) if the 
predicate is nonverbal (nouns, prepositional phrases, adjectives, adverbs) and 
an auxiliary if the predicate is verbal (progressive participles, past participles), 
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although the two uses are commonly conflated under the term copula.” 
(Walker, 2006: 197). 
 
To be is the most common copular verb in the English language (Crystal, 2008: 116). 
Semantically it has little meaning (Croft & Cruse, 2004: 253) and serves mainly to link 
a subject with a predicate. To feel and the less frequent to get are different. Their 
function can be seen as action verbs but also as copulas. The following fragments show 
these in actual utterances: 
 
(4.2.1) CH:EN_4861:PANICKED:00:46  
 
     *Jul: Do you know how (.) PAnicked i get over that?   
 
(4.2.2) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:18:41 
 
     *Deb: [But i] feel  
     *Sar: [mhmm ]  
     (0.7)  
     *Deb: so guilty and horrible […] 
 
(4.2.3) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:21:27 
 
     *Deb: He was the one that got up and walked away,  
     And i (.) i just feel so guilty about that. 
 
(4.2.4) CH:EN_6265:TRIPPING:11:39 
 
     *Har: (I could jus-) it's it's sad sometimes around here.  
        
(4.2.5) CH:EN_5254:RELIEVED:00:40 
 
     *Mar: !NO:! i'm i'm relieved […] 
 
The meaning difference between to get, to be and to feel is concerned with the different 
aspects of the relationship between the subject and the predicate. In fragment 1 the 
copula to get is contained within a complement phrase embedded in a question. It 
creates a link between Julianne who refers to herself with I and predicate adjective 
panicked. The prepositional phrase over that refers back to the cause. The verb implies 
a change in the affective state when presented with the cause. Consequently, the subject 
goes from a state of non-panic to a state of panic.  
 The verb to be is used such as in fragment 5 to establish a definite relationship 
between the subject and the predicate adjective and thus establish a definite claim of 
affect. It creates a link between the subject and the predicate relieved. As a result the 
linguistic design establishes that relieved is an affective state that Marie finds herself to 
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be in. In fragment 4 the case is that Harriet perceives some situation or geographical 
location as being sad.  
 Some verbs are based on sensory perception (Rojo & Valenzuela, 2005). These 
verbs are used to describe our experience of the world for example through vision or 
touch. The verb feel is an example of a perceptual verb. It can be used to describe the 
somatic feel of objects. Yet it can also be used to describe the feel of affectivity. Thus 
you can feel guilty and horrible. However using to be would cause change in the 
meaning. It can be argued that to feel guilty creates the meaning of feeling similar to 
being guilty. Again this implies that the speaker has done something wrong. However 
feeling horrible does not work in the same manner. Arguably, it is used in this context 
to evaluate a mode of feeling. If to be was used, then horrible would be a feature of the 
subject and not the affectivity. The following fragment exemplifies this additionally. 
 
(4.2.6) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:22:02 
 
    *Deb: I feel good about that, 
 
Although this claim of affect is positive where prior claims have been negative, it can 
be used to exemplify the function of the verb. Here Deborah refers to herself with the 
pronoun I followed by the verb feel which establishes a sensory link between the subject 
and the predicate good. It can be argued that Deborah claims to feel good. This means 
that she perceives her affectivity as being good. The prepositional phrase about that 
refers to what it is that Deborah feels herself good about. Perhaps this is something she 
has done or has not done. This suggests that the verb feel has an introspective 
orientation. This means that the speaker uses it to orient to her perception of her mode 
of feeling. Using to be creates an evaluation. Thus if Deborah had used this with good, 
it would have been more attributive to her rather than an aspect of her mode of feeling.  
 Considering temporality, past and perfect tenses are commonly used in the 
claims of affect found in this data collection. Additionally the past and present perfect 
tenses are found to indicate the duration of the affective state. Claims of affect are made 
with mainly declarative sentence types. Yet only one interrogative formulation has been 
encountered. As shown in fragments 1-5, speakers can make use of the present tense 
forms of the verbs to be, to get and to feel like to claim affect. To be is in each case 
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contracted. This is the case when -’m is preceded with a first person singular pronoun 
and -‘s is when a third person singular pronoun is used.  
 The following fragments show claims of affect made in the past tense. 
 
(4.2.7) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:16:49 
 
     *Deb:  <<all> I was> VEry uncomfortable with it.  
 
 
 
(4.2.8) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:18:24 
 
 *Deb: It was awful […] 
 
This construction allows the speaker to claim affect isolated to the past. It is commonly 
observed in narratives describing a situation where the speaker claims to feel in a 
certain way.  
 The following fragment is an instance of to feel in the past tense. This tense has 
only been found alongside first person singular pronouns occupying the grammatical 
subject position of the sentence.  
  
(4.2.9) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:17:05 
 
     *Deb: I just felt (0.2) too  
     (0.4)  
     was like uncomfortable […]  
 
Although Deborah abandons her initial TCU, the use of the past tense is similar here 
compared with the prior two fragments. The conversationalist is claiming that she felt 
uncomfortable at a past point in time.  
 Conversationalists can create the present perfect using a combination of 
auxiliary and main verbs. A combination of the present tense form of the verb to have 
and the past participle of to be creates the present perfect:  
 
(4.2.10) CH:EN_4556:STINKY:07:10 
 
     *Pat:   It has (.) bee:n 
     (0.2)  
     *Amy: (m[:)  
     *Pat:   [horrific. 
 
(4.2.11) CH:EN_EN4556:STINKY:07:45 
 
     *Amy: Thank g[od-  
     *Pat:        [But i'[ve bee]n so depre 
     *Amy:         [(Yeah)] 
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This construction is used to create a temporal construction that commences in the past 
and might still be relevant to the present. For example, it can also be used to claim that 
an interlocutor has been depressed for a certain timespan. The present perfect is a 
powerful tool for doing so as it indicates a time span and not merely a temporal spot.  
 A similar temporal construction is made with the past perfect. However this 
has only been observed in one instance. Combining the past tense form of to have with 
the past participle of to be achieves this.   
 
(4.2.12) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:18:01 
 
     *Deb: <<f> Anyway i had my hands all full of groceries> (.) so 
i'm like ok well let me go upstairs and put my groceries 
down and then (.) <<all> you know> we can go (0.3) have 
a drink (.) whatever (.) talk about this. Cause i had 
been through a lot of strange feelings about it. 
 
This creates a temporal meaning isolated to the past and relevant to the past only. The 
present perfect is temporally relevant to the present only.  
 Various tense constructions create different meaning effects. When 
conversationalists utilise the past or present, they claim affect and take a stance 
temporally locatable in the past or in the moment of speaking. This is related to what 
Chafe (1994) calls “immediate” and “displaced” modes of speaking which were in part 
accounted for in chapter 3. The distinction between these two concepts is found where 
the temporal location of a speaker’s consciousness is located. When a speaker’s 
consciousness is in the immediate mode of speaking, he or she acts or speaks of events 
as they are occurring. In the displaced mode, the speaker reports or remembers past 
events. This means that a speaker can claim affect in the present indicated by the 
present tense. 
  Using the past tense speakers can claim affect during a temporal span in the 
past. In fragment 11 Deborah used this construction to signify that she experienced 
mixed feelings. The temporal construction here makes them not relevant to the present 
in any way in the sense that the temporal span is isolated to the past. The present perfect 
can be used to create a temporal progression commenced in the past but relevant in the 
present. In fragments 9-10 the speakers make claims of affect that originates in the past 
but is still relevant to the present.  
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Not only verbs create temporal meaning. Adverbs are also commonly used to create 
finer temporal or more accurate meanings as Chafe (1994: 205) points out. In fragment 
4.2.4 the speaker uses temporal adverb “sometimes” to indicate occasional relevance.  
4.3 The affective term 
Having described the temporal structures and verb compositions of claims of affect, the 
present section analysis the function of affective terms are used in these utterances.  
 Adjectives are the most common affective terms. They can be both concrete 
and abstract in how they refer to emotion. It may be that they refer directly or 
metaphorically to the affective state. For example the most straightforward affective 
terms are depressed, relieved and panicked. These explicitly refer to an affective state 
and are always encountered with the first person singular pronoun such as in 4.1 and 
4.2.10 (recycled below).  
 
(4.3.1) CH:EN_EN4556:STINKY:07:45 
 
     *Amy: Thank g[od-  
     *Pat:        [But i'[ve bee]n so depre 
     *Amy:         [(Yeah)]  
 
(4.3.2) CH:EN_5907:TIRED:01:25 
   
     *Han: O:h i think i'm dePRESSed. 
 
In fragment 1 Patricia does not complete her turn. Although clearly she is in the process 
of producing the adjective depressed. She also utilises the intensifier so (Goodwin & 
Goodwin, 1987) to upgrade the claim. Fragment 2 shows a fully completed construction 
using depressed as an affective term. 
 A less clear example of an adjective being a constituent of a claim is 
uncomfortable in 4.2.6 recycled below. 
 
(4.3.3) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:16:49 
 
     *Deb:  <<all> I was> VEry uncomfortable with it.  
 
This adjective can be used to describe physical discomfort. However it can also be used 
to describe affective discomfort. The term cross-domain mapping describes this 
phenomenon (Lakoff, 1993). This concept is used to describe how a word from one 
domain can be used to describe another abstract concept.  
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Other examples of adjectives that serve a function in creating claims of affect are hard 
as in 3.2 and stuck (shown below). Both these adjectives have to do with force. Stuck 
can be used to refer to a state in which an agent is experiencing immobility. On the 
other hand, hard can be used either to refer to the tactile sensation of an object or of 
something’s ability to apply force to something else.  
 
(4.3.4) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:15:07 
 
     *Deb: It's been really hard on me: […]  
 
(4.3.5) CH:EN_4157:MIDWEST:09:33 
 
     *Broo: But then i see evrybody else getting on with their lives  
   and i'm like (0.2) stuck. 
 
In these fragments the utterances can be interpreted as claiming that an external force is 
acting on the speaker. This idea is closely related to Johnson’s (1987) idea of “image 
schemas”. These are gestalt structures that humans attain by interacting with the world. 
One image schema is that of “force” which humans experience on a daily basis. For 
example, all human beings know what it feels like to experience an external force 
applying pressure such as for example having too tight shoelaces. Johnson argues that 
these force relations are central to language use. In the fragments above, the 
conversationalists use this force relation to claim that something is affecting or 
restraining the conversationalist. However the meaning of these utterances should not 
be thought of in terms of force relations. It should rather be seen as metaphorical 
extensions or what Johnson calls “metaphorical elaborations” of image-schemas. Thus 
Deborah is experiencing something that is affecting her. On the other hand Brooke feels 
that there are no developments in her life.   
 Occasionally adjectives derived from verbs are used as affective terms. The      
-ing form and -ed/-en forms are attached to the verb stem (Crystal, 2008: 352). 
 
(4.3.6) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:18:31 
 
     *Deb: It was  
     (0.6)  
     like  
     (1.1)  
     tormenting. 
 
(4.3.7) CH:EN_4861:PANICKED:00:46  
 
     *Jul: Do you know how (.) PAnicked i get over that?   
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The way Julie structures her question in fragment 7 allows her to use how as an 
intensifier and the -ed form of the verb panic to create an upgraded adjective predicate. 
The sentence is structured as follows: The main clause is do you know and how 
panicked I get over that functions as a complement clause. In the complement clause the 
subject is I. Get, as established in section 4.2, functions as a copular that takes a subject 
complement. This is in this case how panicked. In most instances the complement 
appears after the copula. However this would most likely make Julie’s utterance 
grammatically unacceptable. More importantly it would in this case move focus from 
the amount of panic Julie experiences to that it is Julie who is panicking. This analysis 
is also supported by the fact that she applies stress on the first syllable of panicked. In 
fragment 7, Deborah utilises the suffix -ing to use the verb torment predicatively. 
Tormenting creates the meaning of a troublesome situation.  
 This section has investigated the use of affective terms. These consist of 
adjectives or adjectives derived from verbs. In some instances the claim is established 
with an affective term constructed with cross-domain mapping. Additionally these 
constructions create a negatively valenced affective stance which conversationalists use 
to convey an orientation towards something.  
4.4 Candidate linguistic formats 
In the previous 3 sections the different linguistic structures and properties that make up 
the stances of claims of affect have been accounted for. This section considers multiple 
linguistic structures appearing in the same data fragment that are argued to function in 
similar ways as claims of affect do.  
 
(4.4.1) CF:ENGS_6269:GLANDS:23:03 
 
692   *John: =°h  
693     A:nd the biopsy came back (0.4) maLIgnant.  
694     h° °hh A:h at least they (hadnt) found some  
695     malignant cells IN it.    
696     (0.4)   
697     °hhh And then when she took it out (.) and had a  
698     biopsy run on it they couldn't find any malignant  
699  cells.  
670     (0.7)  
701     °hhh But nowhh THIS one's swelling up, Huhuhuh  
702     °hh A::h it (.) it makes you think about things like  
703  that anyway.= 
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Arguably the first claim of affect is in line 701 and is key to understand the second in 
lines 702-03. It follows an inbreath and initiated with the conjunction but and the 
temporal adverb now followed by this one’s swelling up. Sequentially it follows an 
account for tests giving contradictory results. The function of the conjunction is 
contrastive. It contrasts the development of a new gland with that of an old malignant 
gland. Thus it implies nervousness about the potential malignancy. This is underlined 
by the temporal adverb now by which he deictically locates the statement in the present 
context. This is also achieved stressed determiner this which modifies the pronoun one. 
Thereby he points to the new swollen gland contrary to the old and implies that the new 
one might be malignant. It undermines the negative results of the prior tests. These 
linguistic features convey an affective stance that the new swollen gland is worrying. 
This is followed by laughter and a terminal inbreath (Jefferson, Sacks & Schegloff, 
1987). Inbreaths following laughter invite second speakers to join in. This does not 
happen in this case either due to potential disalignment or due to the fact that John does 
not provide adequate space for it as he instantly reclaims the floor.  
 John then produces a::h followed by the second claim affect. Here as shown in 
section 4.1 the third person pronoun it is used. However it does not contains a clear 
referent. The present tense form of the verb to make is used. It behaves monotransitively 
and takes the direct object in the form of a complement clause you think about things 
like that anyway. As a sentence, this contains the second person singular (or plural) 
pronoun you, which functions as a subject, followed by the verb think in present tense, 
the prepositional phrase about things like that and the adverb anyway. The prepositional 
phrase contains the preposition about and the head noun things which is post-modified 
by like that. Like is a preposition creating a comparative link between things and that. 
That refers back anaphorically. Thereby the utterance confirms that the utterance it 
refers back to as being an affective stance. The verb think and the preposition about are 
used to indicate worry towards things like that. This refers back to but now this one is 
spoiling it up. Like is used establish comparability. The utterance ultimately implies that 
it causes worry to have a new swollen gland when prior have indicated malignancy.  
 Additional evidence for this analysis can be found in Gerard’s empathetic 
treatment of John’s claim of affect (line 704).  
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(4.4.2) CF:ENGS_6269:GLANDS:23:04 
 
701 *John   °hhh But nowhh THIS one's swelling up, Huhuhuh  
702     °hh A::h it (.) it makes you think about things like  
703  that anyway.=  
704 *Ger: =Well yeah. I think I would too. 
  
Gerard’s response shows that he treats John’s prior turn as being a claim of affect. He 
first produces well yeah in line 703. Well is commonly used in conversation to indicate 
that what follows is to be considered disjunctive to the prior (Schegloff & Lerner, 
2009). By using this Gerard indicates that his turn is not entirely in conjunction with 
what would be considered an appropriate response to John’s turn. What follows and 
completes this is a affirming yeah. Thereby he confirms the propositional content of 
John’s utterance. Gerard then produces the empathetic statement I think I would too. 
This stance implies that if he were in John’s situation he would also be worried and be 
thinking about cancer.    
 Another alternative linguistic structure that can be argued to be a claim of 
affect is the following. 
 
(4.4.3) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:18:50 
 
     *Deb: Oh it was awful and i've been beating myself up  
  about it ever since.  
 
The linguistic structure of interest here is and I’ve been beating myself up about it ever 
since which is juxtaposed to the clear claim of affect it was awful. What makes this 
structure a candidate claim of affect is the present perfect verb phrase construction –‘ve 
been beating (myself) up. Especially interesting is Deborah’s linguistic choice beating 
(myself) up containing the present participle beating up. This can both refer to a 
physically violent retributive action towards someone which in this case is Deborah 
herself. She is also the agent. This can be observed by her use of the first person 
pronoun I in the subject position. She refers to herself using the reflexive pronoun 
myself. She uses this in the object position and indicates that she herself is also the 
patient undergoing the acts of the agent. It is highly doubtable that Deborah is violent 
towards herself. Rather it can be argued that she is claiming to be psychologically 
punishing herself. What she has been punishing herself about is the reference it 
appearing within the prepositional phrase about it.  
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In applying this linguistic design, Deborah can be argued to convey an affective state of 
reflexive anger and indignation for having done something which is left unspecified in 
the above fragment.  
 Another type of linguistic construction that can function as a claim of affect is 
the noun phrase.  
 
(4.4.4) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:14:52 
 
9   *Sar: And what about YOU and the secret police man? Uh Hh  
10  [Hh  
11  *Deb: [Oh  
12  (.) god.  
13      (0.7)  
14  *Deb: W[hat ]a mess.  
15  *Sar:  [What] 
 
(4.4.5) CH:EN_5254:RELIEVED:00:40 
 
56  *Mar: !NO:! i'm i'm reLIEved i just (.) wanna get on with  
57      my LIfe, And i'm wondering what the next step  
58      <<all> And who the next person is gonna be> but  
59      i wanna get on because i'm (.) thirtyeight, (0.2)  
60  What a [joke. ]  
61  *Emi:        [(My go]d)=  
62  *Mar: =You know?         
 
Although they are not grammatically complete in the sense that they do not have a 
subject or a verb, they still function as TCUs. As Schegloff (2007: 3) states, “the basic 
shapes that TCUs take are sentences or clauses more generally, phrases and lexical 
items”. Even the smallest linguistic items can function as TCUs and have sequential 
implications. Phrases are no exception to this. The above highlighted phrases are 
designed to work exclamatorily. The head nouns are prefaced with an indefinite article 
a prefaced by the determiner what. This construction creates the meaning effect of 
something being affectively remarkable. Part of this is due inference and the head noun 
is used to assess some circumstance. The noun mess denotes disorganisation. The noun 
joke is used to orient towards significance of the circumstances. Arguably these items 
are in the context here used to imply an affective orientation towards a set of 
circumstances presented in the surrounding talk. Mess, for example, can be used that 
some events are considered disorganised by the speaker. The case of joke implies that 
the speaker considers relations to be ridiculous. Both nouns refer to trouble for the 
speaker. This implies an affective value.   
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This section has investigated alternative linguistic formats that are argued to be claims 
of affect. These have been shown to rely more heavily on inference and verb meaning. 
It has also been shown that claims of affect arguably do not exclusively need to rely on 
affective terms. They can be construed via other linguistic means such verbs, adverbs 
and conjunctions. Inference plays an important role when it comes to interpreting a 
TCU as being a claim of affect. This was shown in fragments 1 and 2.   
4.5 Preliminary conclusion 
In sum this chapter has described the linguistic tools used for creating claims of affect. 
Two distinctive pronouns were found used in claims. One is the first person singular 
pronoun I referring to the claimer. The other is the third person singular pronoun it. This 
was shown not to refer to a single referent. Rather it was shown to function as a “global 
reference” that refers to abstract referents such as situations, events and various 
circumstances. The verbs used in claims of affect are primarily copulas. The difference 
in meaning between to get, to be and to feel was pointed out. To get implied a change of 
state. To be creates a link between the subject and predicate adjective and creates the 
meaning of being in a state. To feel is a sensory verb which is largely introspective and 
implies that the speaker was evaluating her affectivity. The descriptions of the temporal 
constructions showed that speakers make claims of affect that are relevant to the past or 
the present. Additional temporal verb constructions allow the speakers to indicate a 
claim of affect having started in the past and is continuing. It was also shown how 
adjectives and adjectives derived from verbs are used as affective terms to create a 
claim of affect. Others rely on cross-domain mapping and metaphorical extensions of 
image-schemas. Other candidate constructions were described in section 4.4. These 
relied more on use of adverbs, verbs and inference than the traditional claims of affect 
that rely on affective terms.  
5 The function of claims of affect 
Having successfully described the linguistic features of claims of affect in the previous 
chapter 4, this chapter analyses their function and discusses their implication for 
interaction. It will be shown that claimers use affectivity to achieve conversational goals 
and make their emotions public. Conversationalists keep each other responsible for their 
affectivity and the justifiability of the claim in relation to the cause. Sequentially claims 
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of affect can be found in two locations. The first before the cause is presented and the 
second is after. Each sequential location has different interactional implications for the 
unfolding conversation and achieves different conversational goals. The conversational 
partners provide different treatment of the claim in each of these locations. 
 These features justify the following organisation of this chapter. Section 5.1 
investigates sequences where a pre-cause claim of affect generates a new topic and how 
second speakers treat these. It will be shown that they orient the conversation towards 
the cause of the emotional response indicated in the claim. Section 5.2 is divided into 2 
subsections. Subsection 5.2.1 analyses instances of post-cause claims of affect and 
aligning responses. Subsection 5.2.2 investigates disaligning responses. In only one case 
is the disaligning response argued to be the preferred response. In the others, a 
disaligning response is arguably dispreferred. Explicit dispreferred disalignment is 
seemingly rare. However discrete paralinguistic features can also achieve disalignment. 
Section 5.3 concludes the chapter.  
5.1 Pre-cause claims of affect 
When speakers use pre-cause claims of affect, they introduce their causes as new topics 
in conversations. The speaker producing the claim produces the cause immediately 
following. If not a conversational partner orients towards it as missing. The following 
fragment shows a claim being produced after a previous topic has been closed (lines 24-
25).   
 
(5.1.1a) CH:EN_6265:TRIPPING:11:22 
 
8   *Luk: Why don't they go look for another phone.  
9       Hh  
10  *Har: Cause there are no PHOnes in this city they're on  
11  STRIke?  
12  *Luk: Oh.  
13  *Har: HhHh  
14      (0.8)  
15  *Har: °h[h ]The revolution?  
16  *Luk:   [()]  
17  *Har: °h[hh h]h  
18  *Luk:   [Yeah] 
19  *Har: Heh  
20  *Luk: kh kh kh °h 
21      (0.9)  
22      Okay.  
23      (1.7)  
24  *Har: (Luke) it's it's sad sometimes around here. Very  
25      sad and grey a lot, 
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Just prior to Harriet producing her claim, she and Luke end a topic about the people 
queuing for the phone. That closing is imminent is evident from the production of 
“second closing thirds” (SCTs) (Schegloff, 2007) as for example in lines 18 and 22. She 
uses the pronoun it. In this case it is referring Harriet’s geographical location which is 
also evident in the prepositional phrase around here. She uses the affective term sad 
attributed to it using the present tense of the copula to be. This indicates that she is 
speaking in the immediate mode and is claiming it in the moment of speaking. She 
upgrades her claim by recycling sad and adds grey upgrading with very. This focuses on 
degree. She also adds a lot which is temporal. Just prior she has used the temporal 
adverb sometimes to indicate that it is only sad occasionally. Adding a lot makes it more 
frequent. Thereby she has made public that she perceives her surroundings as being sad 
which means that Luke will anticipate that a cause is pending.  
 
(5.1.1b) CH:EN_6265:TRIPPING:11:39 
 
24  *Har: (Luke) it's it's sad sometimes around here. Very sad  
25      and grey a lot,  
26      (4.4)  
27  *Luk: Pourquoi? 
28      (0.4)  
29  *Har: (   )  
30      (0.6) 
31  *Har: The weather.  
32      (0.9)  
33  *Luk: Really?= 
34  *Har: =Only the weather,  
35      (3.1)  
36  *Har: Uhm  
37      (4.4)  
38  *Har: Oh because <<all> let's see> the other night i was  
39  high, 
 
Between the claim and Luke’s response there is a considerably long pause. This may be 
because Luke treats the cause of the claim as pending. Evidence for this is the fact that 
he elicits it with the French interrogative pourquoi which he produces with a rising 
intonation indicating a question. This shows an orientation towards the cause of the 
claim that Harriet has produced due to the fact that she has not yet provided it. Coulter 
(1986) had similar findings extendable to the analysis this fragment. He found that 
when conversationalists are presented with an affective display they begin to look for its 
cause. The same is at play in the fragment investigated here. Luke orients towards the 
cause for Harriet’s claim which she has not provided immediately following. He 
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therefore provides her with the opportunity to do so. Coulter concluded in his study that 
emotion takes an object. The same conclusion is relevant to this fragment. 
 Harriet provides two causes after Luke orients toward it as missing. The first is 
the weather (line 31) which Luke replies to with really. This can be interpreted as 
displaying doubt towards the appropriateness of the cause that Harriet has provided for 
her claim. Harriet repeats it latched to the prior turn. However she modifies it with the 
adverb only. Thereby she implies that it is exclusively the weather. A 3.1-second pause 
follows which Harriet treats as indicating potential disalignment. This is evident from 
the fact that she produces an uhm followed by another very long pause lasting 4.4 
seconds before she finally reveals an appropriate cause for the claim in line 38.  
 Fragments 1a and b show two things. First of all they show that claims need a 
cause and that both the claimer and the responder orients towards it when it is missing. 
Secondly it shows that causes are appropriate to claimed affective response. This is 
especially evident when the second speaker indicates hesitation towards cause provided 
and attempts at eliciting a more appropriate one. With really, Luke displays reluctance 
towards accepting the weather as the proper cause. Therefore Harriet responds with a 
new cause. Additionally this suggests that interlocutors orient towards one another’s 
affective states as structured in the way that affective states have causes and these 
causes may be more or less apt in comparison with others.  
 The following example shows the same orientation towards the cause of a 
claim of affect. Here it is elicited by an “itemised news inquiry” (line 9) (Button & 
Casey, 1985). 
 
(5.1.2) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:14:52 
 
9   *Sar: And what about YOU and the secret police man? Huh  
10  huh[ huh  
11  *Deb:    [Oh 
12  (.) god.  
13      (0.7)  
14  *Deb: W[hat ]a mess.  
15  *Sar:  [What]  
16      (0.6)  
17  *Sar: <<p> What happened?>  
18      (1.0)  
19  *Deb: H[e's        mar]ried.   
20  *Sar:  [Is he married.]  
21  *Deb: And  
22      (0.4)  
23      He: (.) his wife (.) just had a baby like (.) like  
24      to weeks ago or something.  
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25      (0.9)  
26  *Sar: <<p> Wo:w>  
27      (0.8)  
28  *Deb: It's been really hard on me: because i  
29      (0.6)  
30      you know i (.) i have so many (0.3) ideals and  
31      principles and everything. And it was like ( )  
32  everything just  
33      (1.0)  
34      went out the window when this all happened because  
35      when I MET him i really i didn't know he was  
36  married, 
 
Sarah inquires about the latest news about Deborah and a man she is interested in. That 
they have talked about this man before is evident in her referring to him as the secret 
policeman. However Deborah does not respond with the latest news. Rather she 
produces oh God. This response is the first sign of trouble. Next she produces a claim of 
affect which is formatted exclamatorily. It contains only an adjective phrase which is 
modified by the determiners what and a. These in conjunction upgrade the intensity of 
the head adjective mess to describe an affective and contextual disorganisation. This is 
also evident in her additional claim of affect produced in line 28 where she states that 
it’s been really hard on me. Messy can therefore be argued to describe the affective state 
caused by the fact that he is married and has a child. 
More importantly Sarah orients towards the claim in a similar way as Luke 
does in fragment 1b by displaying that it needs a cause with what’s happened. This 
utterance’s interrogative format is supported by a rising intonation. Deborah meets this 
interrogative format by producing a SPP presenting the cause. The cause is then that he 
is married (line 19). As in the previous fragments, the second speaker orients towards 
the cause by eliciting it. Therefore the claim functions as a topical elicitor providing an 
opportunity for talking about the cause.  
 The following fragment shows an example of a claim (line 38) developing out 
of an extended pre-sequence.  
 
(5.1.3a) CH:EN_5907:SO_TIRED:00:55 
 
10  *Han: Alrighty,  
11      (0.5)  
12      °hh Well anyway i'm sorry that i didn't call you  
13      back on <<all> friday> (.) khh (0.3) goodness sake.  
14      (0.8)  
15      I don't know what's the matter with me. I'm so  
16      TIred i can hardly move.   
17      (0.5)  
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18  *Liz: B[ummer.]  
19  *Han:  [Ever. ]  
20      (1.6)  
21  *Liz: Well?  
22      (0.2)  
23  *Han: huhh° (.) [Oh well.]  
24  *Liz:     [You don']t really sound  
25      (1.0)  
26  *Liz: really the same,  
27      (0.6)  
28  *Han: °hh Well th We don't have an awfully good  
29  connection.  
30      (0.8)  
31  *Liz: I think so. I can hear you okay,  
32      (0.4)  
33  *Han: Hmʔ  
34      (0.6)  
35  *Liz: It's just (.) i don't know your voice sounds kind  
36  of funny,  
37      (1.2)  
38  *Han: O:h i think i'm dePRESSed. 
 
Whereas fragments 1a and b showed that claims could follow out of nothing after a 
prior topic had been closed, the above fragment shows how claims can be methodically 
introduced by making ones conversational partner notice a problem such as Hannah 
does (lines 12-13 and lines 15-16). Liz’ well (line 21) is designed to elicit the cause. She 
passes this opportunity by producing oh well. Liz overlaps (line 24) producing a turn in 
which she notes that Hannah’s voice quality is changed. Hannah blames this on the 
connection. Liz does a counter in her subsequent turn (lines 31). Hannah then produces 
a short hm ending with a glottal stop which gives it a short emphatic character. 
Arguably she uses it to display a confused display towards the source. Liz repairs her 
initial noticing in lines 35-36 followed by Hannah’s claim of affect. 
 The claim is prefaced by an oh which is a “change of state” token (Heritage, 
1984). It marks the realisation of what the cause is. With the claim itself she attributes 
the affective term depressed to herself or I via the copular verb to be which in this case 
is present tense and contracted form –‘m. The claim is itself contained in a complement 
clause. In the main clause she indicates that she thinks. Thereby she backs down from 
the certainty of the propositional content of the complement clause. She is speaking in 
the immediate mode to indicate that what she is feeling is felt in the moment of 
speaking.  
 In this example, Hannah indicates lexically that there is a problem. Although 
no phonetic analysis has been done on this example, it seems evident from the way Liz 
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treats Hannah’s talk that it is designed to elicit something. This is supported by the 
findings of Local and Walker (2008). They argued similarly that vocal characteristics 
play a sequential role in getting the opportunity to talk about ones problem. They came 
to this conclusion by analysing similar sequences as the above where one interlocutor 
would notice something in the vocal characteristics of their conversational partner. 
What is also evident in the above fragment is that the vocal behaviour is noted and 
oriented towards as having a cause. Whereas in fragment 1b Luke oriented Sarah 
towards her not having provided the cause for the claim, Liz’ response is sympathy. 
 
(5.1.3b) CH:EN_5907:SO_TIRED:01:25 
 
36  *Han: O:h i think i'm dePRESSed.  
37      (0.9)  
38  *Liz: O::[:h.   ] 
39  *Han:   ([Xexexe]) thomas called  
40      (1.0)  
41      and i MISSed the call, 
42      (0.6)  
43  *Liz: O::[:h  
44  *Han:    [But on the answering machine he said  
45      (0.7)  
46      well mom (.) i'm (.) uhm  
47      (0.4)  
48      ( ) i'm going to memphis tennessee for seven  
49  months. 
 
Liz’ response is arguably expressing sympathy. Evidence for this analysis can be found 
in line 43 where she recycles Oh. However in this context she responds to the cause. In 
providing Liz with the cause Hannah conveys a conflict: Something good has happened 
(Thomas called). Yet something bad happened afterwards (I missed the call). That there 
is a relationship between the two TCUs is evident by the conjunction and. This is 
despite the 1.0-second pause that splits the two and may work as a rhetoric tool. Hannah 
also underlines the negativity by emphasising the first syllable in missed. In the prior 
fragments Luke oriented towards the cause as missing and provided a slot for it. Here 
Liz has more invested in the interaction. What this means is that she has noticed a 
problem indicated by Hannah and pursues it over number of turns. By doing so she also 
aligns to it as being the accepted cause of the conveyed problem and not for example a 
bad connection. In other words, it shows an orientation towards the vocal display as 
indicating trouble that has a cause which may or may not be more or less appropriate. 
Appropriateness is important here for understanding why Liz accepts depressed and not 
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bad connection. Hannah’s first candidate does not fit her conveyed problem in 
accordance with Liz’ expectations. However the second candidate does.  
 These examples show a clear tendency in the function of claims of affect which 
is that they are dependent on the cause. This finding supports the assumptions of 
Coulter (1986) that emotion takes an object. This is based on the finding that second 
speakers provide the claimers with the opportunity to provide the cause. Responses 
show that second speakers orient towards the cause when they are met with a claim. 
This is particularly evident when the claimer does not immediately provide it for them. 
Another important concept is that of appropriateness between the cause and claim. 
Second speakers may treat a cause as inappropriate to the claim. The claimer can 
therefore be required to provide an appropriate one. Another type of response to the 
claim of affect is the sympathetic one. Prior to this response a problem has already been 
conveyed. The claim of affect then can be seen as a linguistic realisation of that. With a 
sympathetic response, the second speaker reaffirms the connection between the 
paralinguistic cues that lead to the lexicalised claim and the claim itself. The claim of 
affect can therefore be seen as an intersubjective achievement.  
5.2 Post-cause claims of affect 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, post-cause claims of affect are 
functionally different from pre-cause claims. In general post-cause claims are designed 
for again making affectivity public and for the second speaker to take a stance towards. 
It will be shown in subsection 5.2.1 that some claims prefer alignment. However they 
may not always get it. This is shown in section 5.2.2 which also shows a case of a 
preferring disalignment. Most claims disprefer disalignment. Disalignment can be 
achieved in a number of ways such as lexically and paralinguistically. The latter relies 
on phonetic features and occasionally no features at all to create disalignment other than 
pauses in between turns. With the first, conversationalists disalign overtly using word 
level linguistic items.  
5.2.1 Alignment 
The following fragment is an example of a claim of affect appearing after the cause has 
been presented (line 188): 
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(5.2.1a) CH:EN_4556:STINKY:04:53 
 
162 *Amy: You know I tell you it's just been one thing after  
163  another.  
164     (0.6)  
165     And as soon as she has (.) gotten over ONE she's  
165     just hit with something else. (.) But when you talk  
166     to her she's just wonderful. You know she just  
167  really tries to keep her (.) spirits up and   
168     (0.8)  
169     tries to help evrybody else.  
170     (0.9)  
171     (The kids) her kids have been great and julie's  
172  been great.  
173     (0.7)  
174 *Pat: °hh [(  )] 
175 *Amy:     [Jul ]ie did get to atlantic city for a month.  
176     She rented a place there?=  
177 *Pat: =<<f> O:h.>  
178 *Amy: Yeah (.) so she had a [(.)] good [(.) GOO]D month.  
179 *Pat:                       [( )]      [Good.  ]  
180     (0.8)  
181 *Amy: It wasn't until the end that (.) that judy  
182     (0.5)  
183     wasn't  
184     (0.3) 
185     so well ( ) wasn't feeling so well again?  
186     (0.9)  
187 *Pat: U:[ah     ]  
188 *Amy:   [<<f>But] it's stinky.> 
 
What goes on prior to the claim being produced in line 188 is that Amy is narrating 
about a cancer struck friend. It is initiated with the conjunction but followed by the 
global referent it with the contracted present tense copular verb –‘s attached. It is 
followed by the affective term stinky. Thus she uses the immediate mode of talking to 
indicate that this is how she perceives the events in the here and now. Just prior Amy 
has stated that Judy has had a good good month (line 178) and that it was not until the 
end that she got a setback (lines 181-85). This ends the narrative positively. The claim 
of affect is used to imply that this is bad despite the positive aspects. That the affective 
term stinky is metaphorical. It describes an unpleasant smell and in the usage here it is 
used to describe a situation experienced as unfair or negative. Thereby Amy creates an 
affective stance towards the events she has just described. This stance is affective in 
nature. This is because she is emotionally affected by what is described immediately 
before.  
 Another question is whether the increase in loudness in her turn claiming affect 
is an indicator of “heightened emotive involvement” or “emphatic speech style”. Selting 
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(1994: 383) argues that one of the characteristics of this speech style is an increased 
loudness compared to the surrounding speech. Other markers are pitch and 
accentuation. The question is whether Amy is applying this to her claim of affect. In 
line 187, Patricia is producing a response cry which Amy overlaps. This overlap may be 
part of the cause for a raised loudness. However she is applying stress to the first 
syllable of stinky and thereby stresses it. This could be an indicator of a raised 
involvement.  
 This fragment shows how a conversationalist by linguistic means creates an 
affective bond between herself and circumstances related to a friend of hers. Thus she 
claims that having a friend with cancer has affective consequence for her. Additional 
evidence for this can be found in Amy’s response below. 
 
(5.2.1b) CH:EN_4556:STINKY:05:26 
 
187 *Pat: U:[ah     ]  
188 *Amy:   [<<f>But] it's stinky.>  
189     (0.2)  
190     It [IS.]   
191 *Pat:    [I  ]know.=  
192 *Amy: =It i[s  just]  
193 *Pat:      [We've h]ad a very stinky u:hm  
194     (0.3)  
195     We're fine.  
 
As Amy emphasises her claim (line 190), Patricia produces the empathetic response I 
know (line 191). Thereby she creates an epistemic stance that indicates that she knows 
Amy’s affectivity. She provides yet more evidence for this analysis by producing her 
own second story prefaced by a claim of affect in line 193. Although she does not 
complete the TCU it is evident that she is not assessing a smell but a set of 
circumstances contributing to a negative experience. This shows that she orients 
towards Amy’s turn as being affective. She recycles the same affective term which she 
uses describe an experience. She uses the present perfect tense with which she indicates 
a progression from the past into the present. It also supports that she claims to know 
how Amy feels. It makes a second story relevant in which she exemplifies her epistemic 
stance regarding Amy’s situation and assesses it as being stinky to have a friend with 
cancer. So in responding empathetically and producing a claim of affect, Patricia makes 
the talk about the cause relevant. More evidently she claims to know Amy’s affectivity.  
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Additional evidence for this analysis can be found in Patricia’s own treatment of a case 
accounted for in her story. Here, she does two claims of affect that orient towards her 
own stories as having an affective implication on her.  
 
(5.2.2) CH:EN_4556:STINKY:06:25 
 
256 *Pat: But he's PAralysed on one [side and he's]  
257 *Amy:                     [O:h [(.)   go]::d.  
258     (0.2)  
259     bli (.) half blin[d and then he's]  
260 *Amy:      [O:h            ] (.) what a  
261  shame.=  
262 *Pat: =<<f> And>  [so that>   ]  
263 *Amy:       [Is he about] (.) tim's age?  
264     (0.4)  
265 *Pat: <<f> Yea[h> a]nd it i mean he's (.) REALly a very  
266 *Amy:         [Yeah]  
267     good friend and it'[s been hor]rible.  
268 *Amy:                    [(Really  )]  
269     (Oh [okay)  
270 *Pat:     [(But it's been) And his mind seems to be  
271     coming back which w[e I mean to] be back  
272 *Amy:                   [Oh     okay]  
273  almo[st which i]s             
274      [Ye:a      ]h     
275     (0.2)  
276 *Amy: (X[exe   ]) 
277 *Pat:   [wonder]ful. But THAT was awful.  
 
Patricia does a number of claims of affect after accounting a bicycle crash a friend of 
hers has been in. She creates an affective bond with the friend and he’s really a very 
good friend. This allows her to be emotionally affected by the circumstances. The noun 
friend implies the bond which she upgrades using the adjective good. This she 
underlines with the intensifying adverb really. She adds stress to the first syllable of the 
word. She then produces the claim of affect. She uses the global referent it referring to 
the accident and experience of having a friend in that situation. With –‘s been, she 
establishes a temporal span that goes from the accident to the present. It encompasses 
everything in between and attributes it with the affective term horrible. 
 Returning to fragment 1b and Amy’s claim with Patricia’s response, fragment 
2 shows that Patricia orients toward it as an opportunity to initiate a similar activity 
where she can present her own similar experiences which ultimately justifies her 
empathetic response towards Amy’s claim of affect. Nevertheless not all responses to 
claims of affect lead to a second narrative. However in many cases responses to claims 
are empathetic and claims knowledge of how the claimer is feeling. This can be done in 
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reference to own experience. In these fragments both women are engaged in narratives 
that establish them as having an affective connection with people who are struck by 
illnesses. This affective bond is linguistically realised by the two women and displayed 
intersubjectively towards each other. Both use their knowledge of their friends and do 
assessments of them. In effect both conversationalists create their affectivity in the 
situation by using the linguistic tools at their disposal. 
 In the following fragment stemming from a conversation between Brooke and 
Judy, Brooke produces multiple claims of affect. 
 
(5.2.3) CH:EN_4157:SO_JEALOUS:08:52 
 
35  *Judy: No:hohoh  
36  *Broo: [No::] HhhHh ( )[(  )]  
37  *Judy: [Mos ]t of my friends are SINgle i was just SAying  
38      like 
39      °hhh  
40      I mean i'm not the first one to get married at a:ll  
41      but STILL. I'm still in like that first BUNCH?=  
42  *Broo: =Oh really?  
43  *Judy: Yeah.  
44  *Broo: Oh my wa:ve must have struck early then because (.) 
45      EVerybody i know is married or getting married and i'm  
46  (.) SO jealous.  
47  *Judy: Oh really?  
48  *Broo: In fact i was totally my  
49      (0.6)  
50      my spanish (.) BOYfriend EXboyfriend i don't know  
51      what he is (.) but we're always together  
52      (0.4)  
53      about your wedding? <<all> And i was like> i'm so  
54  excited.  
55      (0.3)  
56      He's gonna be outta town or else i'd make him go  
57  and we'd go.  
58      (0.6)  
59      But [uhm  ]  
60  *Judy:     [(But)]  
61      (1.0)  
62  *Broo: I was like <<all> i'm just so excited for her I  
63      said oh she's so lucky and then they're gonna go  
64      live in spain as well> and he's just like ok ok i'm  
65  sick of your frie[nds now will you  shut u]p,  
66  *Judy:               [Hh Hh Hh  Hh  Hh  Hh  Hh] 
67  *Broo: [(I) just all i talk about. I'm just] so happy for  
68  *Judy: [Huh    huh     huh      huh     °hh]  
69  *Broo: evrybody. 
70      (0.6)  
71  But then i see evrybody else getting on with their  
72      lives and i'm like (0.2) stuck.  
73      (0.4)  
74  *Judy: Oh but it'll be worth the wait. Believe me i KNOW  
75      how you feel. HhhHh  
76  *Broo: It's horrid?  
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77      (0.2)  
78  *Judy: I know. 
 
The claims are spread across this fragment. Here only some will be highlighted. The 
first is and I’m so jealous. It is done in the present tense by which she is claiming to be 
jealous in the moment of speaking and in general considering the topic. She treats it as 
inviting further talk which is a function Wilkinson and Kitzinger (2009: 169) also 
found. It is also evident from the fact that Brooke expands on this in her response. It 
functions as a post-cause claim because the cause is presented immediately prior. The 
cause for her jealousy is then that all her friends are married.  
 Brooke creates a complex stance in her following narrative. She first of all 
establishes a positive stance towards her friends getting married. However she also 
indicates problems with regards to her own relationship with her Spanish gentleman 
who is positioned as being less than interested (lines 61-65). He is generally portrayed 
as being at least non-committing to their relationship. Also Brooke does multiple repairs 
on what their relationship is by repairing boyfriend then ex boyfriend (lines 50-51). She 
then creates a negative epistemic stance by stating that she don’t know what he is. In her 
self-reported speech indicated by and I was like, she accounts for an instance where she 
tells her Spanish boyfriend that she is excited. She exits the reported speech in line 67 
when she does another claim with which she claims to be happy. The claim of affect 
appearing in the reported speech does not demand a response because it is a report from 
another conversation and is immediately followed by other information. The multiple 
claims of affect in this fragment create a complex affectivity with both being happy and 
jealous. This culminates in the “punchline” (Goodwin, 1985; Jefferson, 1978) of her 
narrative (line 71-72). The punchline arguably indicates the purpose of the story. In this 
case, Brooke is being positive towards everybody seemingly getting married or being 
married. This is contrasted with her own situation. People are getting on with their lives 
and she is stuck. This creates an implied claim of affect as feeling stuck in this context 
creates the meaning of immobility. This is designed to let her complain about her social 
situation. 
 Evidence for this can be found in Judy’s empathetic response (lines 74-75) and 
what happens after. First of all, she states that it will be worth the wait which implies 
change for the better. The sentence constructs the future tense using the modal verb will 
and the infinitive form be. The global reference and subject it is predicated with worth 
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the wait. Judy’s authority for stating this comes from her being married and having been 
in a similar situation. This is evident in the second TCU of her turn where she says 
believe me I know how you feel. Thereby she claims access to Brooke’s affective state. 
She does this by using the imperatively formatted believe me to underline her authority. 
This is followed by the epistemic main clause I know and the complement how you feel. 
The complement clause contains the second person singular pronoun you referring to 
Brooke followed by the verb feel. The relative adverb how is at the head of the clause 
and refers to the manner of feeling. In effect she uses the imperative believe me to 
emphasise and underline I know how you feel. Consequently she enforces her claim of 
access to Brooke’s affective state with additional stress added to know. Brooke produces 
a claim of affect immediately following. The global reference it is predicated with the 
affective term horrible. This design is perhaps also the most transparent when it comes 
to reference to emotion because it appears immediately after access has been claimed by 
Brooke who aligns again in line 78 with I know. Thereby she again claims knowledge to 
how Brooke is feeling. By doing this Brooke also indicates a presumption that Brooke 
is feeling in a certain way. This she legitimises by reference to her own authority and 
experiences.  
 With these few turns the two interlocutors have arrived at a conclusion that 
being unmarried and waiting for a proposal to happen is horrible. This means that 
through interaction and using language they have established an affective relationship. 
It may be that certain neurological processes are at play that creates the physical 
response with discontent. It is impossible to know. Ultimately it is not important in this 
context. What is known is that language is used to construct a reality where Brooke is 
unmarried, has a noncommittal boyfriend and is happy for everyone but herself. By 
doing so she implies a complex affective relationship which is used as a complaint 
mobilised to get a positive reassurance. When Judy states that it will eventually happen, 
she is reassuring Brooke. Thus Judy is providing her with the prospect of something 
good happening. 
 This suggests that claims of affect should be considered public displays. They 
are linguistically constructed social objects that can be held forward by the claimer for 
other conversationalist to deal with. In most cases this response is preferred as 
positively valenced. This means that they confirm that the claimer’s affective response 
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is valid considering the cause. The acceptance or alignment is done empathetically by 
claiming knowledge of the claimers feelings. Alignment can be achieved by reference to 
similar experience. This was shown in the above fragments. For example in fragments 
1a and b Amy’s story sparks a claim which is accepted empathetically by Patricia and 
triggers a pre-cause claim of affect. It was shown in the previous section that pre-cause 
claims of affect make talk about the cause relevant. This is also the case here. However 
the cause is in this case deemed topically relevant to the prior and is therefore arguably 
used for justifying the claim of knowledge of the claimed affective state.  
 However this fragment is fundamentally different from fragment 3. This 
difference may in part be due to the different activities the speakers are engaged in. In 
fragments 1a and b Amy is producing a narrative on how she is affected by her friend 
who has cancer. This is an indirect problem for her. However, the person being affected 
in Brooke’s narrative is herself.  She is in effect portraying herself as being in trouble 
socially as she is not getting married. This is therefore having an affective response. Her 
claims of affect can therefore arguably be seen as both making her affectivity public. 
However it also objectifies her affectivity so that Judy can treat it as she is the more 
experienced party.   
 All these fragments show that claiming affect establishes a causative link 
between a cause and an affective response. Whereas pre-cause claims of affect make 
talk about the cause relevant, post-cause claims make an affective negotiation relevant 
with regards to it being dealt with and aligned to by a second speaker. The claims imply 
an affective stance towards a set of circumstances that the speaker complains about or is 
accounting for. When it comes to responses, alignment is in these instances achieved 
empathetically such as with an experience. A similar experience may manifest itself 
through a second story as in fragment 1b. In fragment 3, authority and experience were 
closely connected with the evaluation of a situation eventually changing for the better 
and claiming knowledge of the affective state of the one undergoing it. These facts also 
show an orientation toward the appropriateness of claims of affect which may not be 
fully appreciated at this point in the chapter. It will become more evident in the 
following subsection. Deborah oriented Judy towards her affective state in the situation 
and thereby contextualising it.   
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5.2.2 Disalignment 
Having analysed claims of affect and the aligning responses that some of them get how 
they objectify affectivity, indicate an affective stance towards some circumstance and 
elicit a particular response. This section will analyse claims of affect receiving 
disaligning responses from the second speaker. In some instances this is dispreferred. 
However in one case it is the preferred response type. These responses will show how 
explicitly that conversationalists orient towards the appropriateness of the claim and its 
context. In the most explicit case of disalignment, the second speaker may deem the 
claim inappropriate and ultimately deny the interlocutor the right to her claim. This 
subsection begins with analyses of less clear and more implicit disaligning responses. 
Only one instance has been found of a clearly disaligning response to a claim of affect 
which suggest a preference for alignment.  
 The following fragment is an example of disalignment, which is implied by 
paralinguistic features. 
 
(5.2.2.1a) CH:EN_4092:YUCKY:12:56 
 
8   *Ad: So I have my little (.) I D ((spelling)) card to go  
9       there which is very exciting.  
10  *Lu: [(Xexe)  ]  
11  *Ad: [I'm goin]g there tomorrow. 
12      °hh[h   ]  
13  *Lu:    [That] is wonderful. 
14      (0.7)  
15  *Ad: Yeah.  
16      (0.4)  
17  *Ad: But i had to explain in kind of (.) great detail  
18      (what) my research was.  
19  *Lu: (Yes)  
20      (0.7) 
21  *Ad: Yeah  
22      (0.3)  
23  *Lu: Yeah  
24      (1.3)  
25  *Lu: Well that's good.  
26      (0.2)  
27  *Lu: That'll give you something  
28      (0.7)  
29  *Lu: to do:,  
30      (0.4)  
31  *Ad: M:-  
32      Yeah,  
33    (0.4)  
34      °hhh  
35      But a:hh every time i go up to that bunac office to  
36      look at like part time jobs and stuff they're just  
37  so crappy.  
38      (0.3)  
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39  *Lu: Oh-  
40      (1.0)  
41  *Ad: I mean it's like (.) literally chambermaid jobs.  
42      (0.2)  
43  *Lu: Mhm-  
44      (0.2)  
45  *Ad: For like four (.) twenty-five an hour.  
46      (0.9)  
47  *Lu: Mhmm-  
48      (1.1)  
49  *Ad: Like i mean REALly yucky.  
50     (0.8)  
51  *Lu: Mhm-  
52      (2.2)  
53  *Ad: So (.) i'm kinda depressed about that,  
54      (0.5)  
55  *Lu: Sure- 
 
Adele’s claim of affect (line 53) is achieved through a series of upgraded assessments 
and “extreme case formulations” (Pomerantz, 1986) about locally available jobs. Just 
prior (line 25), Lucy assesses well that’s good. Subsequently in lines 27-29, she 
concludes that’ll give you something to do at the prospect of Adele going to the British 
Library to do her research. Adele’s responses m (line 31) and yeah (line 32) are marking 
receipt of Lucy’s assessment. What she does next (lines 35-37) shows that she treats 
Lucy’s prior turn at talk as positioning her as being idle. The topical cohesion is 
enforced by the contrasting conjunction but. It indicates that the propositional content of 
what is to follow contrasts with the prior. Here she excuses and defends her idleness by 
characterising the available jobs as being so crappy. Thereby she is implying that they 
are not worth it. Also present is an extreme case formulation every time suggesting that 
the event is recurring. Lucy replies with oh. Adele treats this response as doing 
disalignment which can be observed in line 41 where she does self-initiated repair on 
her prior turn (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks, 1977). This is indicated with I mean. 
Having initially been characterised with the adjective crappy, they are now 
characterised as literally chambermaid jobs which functions as an upgraded assessment. 
Literally denotes exactness of the propositional content and the noun chambermaid jobs 
implies a job not worth taking. This disalignment and upgrade repeats over a couple of 
turns until the claim of affect is produced. 
 As it can be observed Adele is trying to get Lucy to align to her idleness being 
caused by the nature of the available jobs. Lucy’s pending disalignment suggests that 
this is not a viable cause. Stevanovic (2012) showed how phonetic features are 
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interactionally significant in decision-making sequence. By investigating Finnish 
workplace interaction she found that assessments or “approval turns” of prior 
propositions with a flat intonation halts a decision from being made. This suggests that 
the phonetic design is salient for the unfolding sequence. In Adele and Lucy’s 
conversation Lucy’s minimal responses are negligible in that they are linguistically 
sparse, phonetically short with a flat intonation. Adele treats this as displaying 
disalignment. 
 Adele’s claim of affect (line 53) can be seen as another attempt at supporting 
her own stance and eliciting alignment from Lucy. In doing so she brings an affective 
dimension into the conversation. It creates an affective link between the jobs and Adele. 
She is depressed due to a lack of appropriate jobs. She uses the causative so to indicate 
this. The jobs are referred to in the prepositional phrase about that. She does a slight 
mitigation with the contracted phrase kinda implying the she is somewhat or something 
related depressed. 
 However the claim of affect gets only a minimal response which on the surface 
aligns. The prosody is again flat. As evident from Adele’s response this is not doing 
alignment. As a consequence of this, neither of the participants is willing to back down. 
Therefore the sequence ultimately dies out with a topic change line 81. 
 
(5.2.2.1b) CH:EN_4092:YUCKY:13:23 
 
53  *Ad: So (.) i'm kinda depressed about that,  
54      (0.5)  
55  *Lu: Sure-  
56      (1.3) 
57  *Ad:  I mean if they Well i mean if you know if it's  
58      (0.9)  
59      you know means to an end this like whole (.)  
60      program or whatever for me. But °hhh but °hh if i'd  
61      known in advance °hhh  
62      (0.7)  
63      that the only jobs that i could get would be like 
64      bartending.  
65      (0.3)  
66  *Lu: Mh[m-  
67  *Ad:   [Well here bartending isn't even bartending cause  
68      no one gets mixed drinks they only get  
69      (0.4) 
70      bitter or ale or beer (and) you [know  (draughts)].  
71  *Lu:         [huh (0.2) hh (.)]heh 
72  hehehe 
73  *Ad: And they're a:ll on tap so.  
74      (0.2)  
75  *Lu: Uh huh.  
76      (0.6)  
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77  *Ad: <<p> Mm yeah>  
78      (0.9)  
79  *Lu: (Yeah)  
80      (1.0)  
81  *Ade: And how is Thomas?  
  
In backing down, Adele changes the topic gradually. Firstly she makes one more effort 
to achieve alignment. She takes an evaluative stance towards the academic program she 
is enrolled in. She characterises it as means to an end (lines 57 and 59-61). This 
suggests that what she is doing is necesarry to achieve a certain goal which she does not 
specify. Despite it being necesarry she infers that bartending is not (63-64). She does 
this by using the contrasting conjunction but heading the utterance followed by the 
conjunction if. Together these establish and indicate a hypothetical epistemic stance. 
The stance is created with a first person pronoun and the past perfect tense verb phrase 
I’d known. As argued previously the verb know is used to refer to a knowledge state. 
The fact that she uses the past perfect here suggest that if she had known some set of 
circumstances then the meaning would have been different. She makes explicit the set 
of circumstances in the complement clause that the only jobs would be like bartending. 
Although she never makes the outcome explicit. 
 However, this does not make Lucy provide an aligning response. This makes 
Adele abandon the topic gradually over her following turns. These two fragments show 
first of all that disalignment does not have to be achieved by lexical means. It can rely 
on paralinguistic features. They show how different stances can collide only to die out 
when neither conversationalists is willing to back down from their view. A second 
speaker can hold a first speaker in check with very minimal linguistic means when 
deeming her claim unjust. It also suggests that personal views and emotions may be 
genuine enough. Yet that does not mean that the second speaker has to accept either as 
she may indicate a mismatch between the cause and the claim. The post-cause claim of 
affect is produced in order to achieve a particular goal. In the above fragment for 
example, Adele does this to achieve alignment which will confirm that she is justly idle. 
A second speaker responding to an interlocutor’s claim of affect may show reluctance 
towards the proper fitting of the emotion to the context if she considers it inappropriate. 
In the prior fragment for example, Lucy conveys that the nature of the available jobs is 
not a viable excuse for being idle. She does this by formatting her minimal responses as 
negligible as possible. Thereby she implies that substandard jobs are not valid causes 
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for being depressed and idle. This means that interlocutors monitor and indeed judge 
their co-conversationalists’ social and indeed private affective lives. Not only do second 
speakers do this. First speakers actively seek confirmation for their affect and its 
relation to other circumstances and they use it to achieve conversational goals such as in 
this example where Adele is trying to justify not having a job. This then suggests that 
affectivity is not as private as some theorists and researchers suggest (cf.  Heritage, 
2008). It is in fact a social tool that has multiple social functions.   
 It is important to recall here that in studying claims of affect it is possible to 
avoid a subjective interpretation of paralinguistic features and attributing them to certain 
affective and psychological states such as some have (cf. Cowie, 2000; Ververidis & 
Kotropoulos, 2006). Claims of affect provide a lexical access and are therefore present 
at word level. Furthermore second speakers orient towards these as displaying 
affectivity that may be more or less appropriate. This means that the researcher does not 
have to rely on his or her intuition to interpret controversial linguistic features. 
Additionally other researchers have argued that phonetic features are more important for 
the sequential organisation rather than simple conveying an affective state (cf. Local & 
Walker, 2008; Ogden, 2006). This was also suggested in the section on pre-cause claims 
of affect. 
 Returning to the matter of disaligningment it may be the case that the  
preferred response is a disaligning one as the following fragments will be used to show 
that this is due to the contextual environment it is located in. The following analysis will 
show how a conversationalist by linguistic means claims affect in order to deal with her 
guilt with a married man with whom she has had a relationship with. She recounts an 
event with him kissing her and describes her emotions in that situation using claims of 
affect made in the past tense and then produces claims in the present to indicate guilt.   
 
(5.2.2.2) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN18:24 
 
191 *Deb: Well one thing turns into anothe:r he was holding  
192     my HAND (.) he KISSes me.  
193     [It was] awful and [then he]  
194 *Sar: [M:    ]       [(mhm)  ]  
195     (0.3)  
196 *Deb: It was  
197     (0.6)  
198     like  
199     (1.1)  
200     tormenting.  
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201     (0.5)  
202     I i (.) (so) I'm such a jerk mean i (.) i feel like  
203     i committed adultery. I mean nothing happened. I  
204     mean we kissed. (0.2) But that was it. [But i] feel  
205 *Sar:            [mhmm ]  
206     (0.7)  
207 *Deb: so guilty and horrible and here this conversation  
208     is being taped and they'll probably track me  
209  d[own   put]  
210 *Sar:  [No:Huhuhuh]  
211 *Deb: me in jail or i don't know.  
212 *Sar: Ah [Huhuh]  
213 *Deb:    [°h   ]h  
214 *Sar: Hh° 
215 *Deb: Oh it was awful and i've been beating myself up  
216     about it ever since.  
217     (1.3)  
218     And anyway so he finally left and 
 
Here she produces an array of claims of affect that are claimed retrospectively. This 
means they are produced in the past tense to describe an emotion connected to a 
previous situation. The first is produced at a point where the event she is narrating 
reaches a crucial point with him kissing her (lines 191-92). Her linguistic formatting 
and claims of affect work in conjunction to portray him as the agent and her as the 
patient who unwillingly succumbs to his advances. This is observable in her use of 
personal pronouns which she uses to establish him as the agent and her as the patient 
such as in he was holding and he kisses. In these two examples the object of the 
sentence is related to Deborah. In the last example, she refers to herself with the 
pronoun me and thus indicates that she is the patient undergoing an action by the agent. 
The same is the case in the first example. However the reference is based on meronymy. 
She refers to a body part of hers with the possessive determiner my and the noun hand. 
As a consequence she is the patient again. Thereby she indicates that she had no doing 
in the actions she accounts for. 
 It is in this light that the claims of affect should be seen as preferring 
disalignment. She produces her claim of affect it was awful (line 193) which refers to 
the experience of being kissed in that situation. She begins production of a juxtaposed 
sentence which she abandons as Sarah produces two minimal responses in overlap. 
What exactly Sarah is responding to is somewhat unclear. The first mhm overlaps the 
first part of the prior turn which is too early for a response to the claim. It must therefore 
be a response to immediately prior. The last mhm is produced in time for it to be a 
response to the claim of affect. Its production also coincides with Deborah cancelling 
55 
the juxtaposed TCU. Interestingly Deborah produces another claim of affect it was like 
tormenting immediately following (lines 196-200). She does not receive any response 
which can be observed in the pause (line 201). The first two claims are produced in the 
past tense to describe the way she was feeling in the situation. 
 Subsequently she says I’m such a jerk. This is a “self-deprecation” (Pomerantz, 
1984) which gets no response arguably due to the fact that she continues immediately. 
She then states that nothing happened. This she repairs with I mean we kissed and but 
that was it. She then produces a claim of affect with two juxtaposed affective terms 
guilty and horrible which is upgraded with the adverbial so. The combination of nothing 
happening except kissing and a claim of affect that implies feeling guilty is a 
contradiction. Stating that having done nothing and feeling guilty is designed provoke a 
response that confirms she had no responsibility in the events. Fundamentally Deborah 
is not the wrongdoer in her own view. This can be deducted from her linguistic design. 
Deborah attempts to support this making the man the agent in the events. Two more 
claims of affect are produced juxtapositioned to each other. The first, oh it was awful, 
follows the traditional characteristics of claims of affect. The latter simply implies it. 
Here she indicates that she has been beating herself up. This is not a physical 
punishment she is forcing upon herself. Rather, it infers a certain amount of feeling 
guilty. Following this is a 1.3-second pause. 
 As argued these claims are designed to get Sarah to confirm that Deborah is 
not responsible and therefore should not react affectively. The claims get no immediate 
response however other than minimal responses. This happens later in the conversation.  
 
(5.2.2.3) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:20:44 
 
331 *Deb: It's hard to  
332     (1.1)  
333     walk away from it. You know wha[t i mean]? It's  
334 *Sar:                         [R i g h ]t   
335 *Deb: hard not to have any feelings about it. I feel like  
336     i'm just (.) by my (.) self. <<all But anyway.>>  
337     (1.6)  
338 *Sar: W[ell it's no]t in anyway like you  
339 *Deb:  [Huhhh°     ]  
340     (1.4)  
341 *Sar: pursued him or seduced him or !A!nything. I mean i  
342     (.) i hope you can   
343     (1.3)   
344     try not t[o beat yourself u]p (.) too much.  
345 *Deb:    [Yeah             ]  
346 *Sar: Because  
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347     (0.4)  
348     I mean  
349     (1.2)  
350 *Deb: I feel good about that. 
 
Here Sarah responds with well it’s not in anyway like you pursued him or seduced him 
or anything. By doing this she denies her as being agent and having acted with ill will. 
She goes on in her following TCU (lines 338-344) to orient towards Deborah’s 
affectivity. She states that Deborah should try not to beat herself up about it. This 
implies that she should not punish herself affectively. However Sarah does not say that 
Deborah should not be entirely without out guilt either. For example, the adverbial 
phrase too much refers to measure which is modified by the adverb too. Together they 
create the meaning of not overdoing something. In the conversational context it implies 
that Deborah should not overdo feeling guilty.  
 Fragments 2 and 3 show another function of claims of affect than their 
occurrence in sequences that have been previously analysed. They show an instance of a 
claims seeking disalignment. Others have shown to seek alignment. However both 
functions point towards the same thing: namely that affectivity is inherently a social 
phenomenon. For example in certain contexts a speaker can be obliged to feel in one 
way. In other contexts he or she is not. If another conversationalist deems that these 
standards are not met, she can deny the claimer her right to have the emotion.  
 This shows that interlocutors can claim to feel in a certain way and use 
linguistic items to deal with emotional and moral problems. Deborah linguistically and 
interactionally portrays herself as feeling guilty. Yet simultaneously she indicates not 
having done anything. In doing so she works towards a confirmation that she should not 
feel in a certain manner. She is ultimately trying to rid herself of any responsibility she 
might have had in the situation. Deborah looks towards Sarah for an indication of how 
she should feel and Sarah provides her with this when she states that she should not beat 
herself up. Thus Sarah has evaluated the circumstances Deborah has described and 
judged that she is not eligible for the affective punishment she claims to be going 
through. She thereby disaligns towards the claims of affect that Deborah is producing 
which is a response that is arguably preferred.  
 However disalignment is usually dispreferred as the following fragment is 
testament to. It stems from a conversation between Mom and Julianne where Julianne 
produces a claim that Mom disaligns to: 
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(5.2.2.4) CH:EN_4861:PANICKED:00:28 
 
30  *Mom: I'm disappointed that (0.3) th[at ]  
31  *Jul:                   [Sha]ll i quit? You know?  
32  I mean h°  
33  *Mom: <<h> NO.>  
34      No Julie. You have to do what YOU wanna do. I'm 
35      disappointed that i  
36      (0.5)  
37      that i don't (.) see  
38      (0.5)  
39      I don't see where this is getting you. I i don't see  
40      (0.4)  
41      I don't see really (.) ( ) (.) what it is (.) that (.)  
42  that you wanna 
43      (0.3)  
44  *Jul: I don't i have NO idea oka:y?  
45    (0.4)  
46      Do you know how (.) PAnicked i get over that? I've: NO  
47      idea what i wan[na do.]  
48  *Mom:                [Well  ](.) i am ALso disappointed that  
49      you get panicked over that because i don't think that's 
50  at !ALL! 
51      (0.7)  
52      u::m  
53      (0.5)  
54      at at all called for and that's where i'm  
55      disappointed in <<h>myself> because (.) obviously i  
56      didn't do a good enough [job   of  raising   you.]  
57  *Jul:                   [<<p> tsk °hh  (.)  oh   ]  
58  stop that,> 
 
What Mom does with her response (line 48 onwards) is to deny Julianne’s claimed 
affectivity (lines 46-47). This claim is produced after Mom has displayed a negative 
stance towards the job Julianne has undertaken (line 39) and her future plans (lines 41-
42). The stance is achieved with negative adverb not in its contracted form –n’t. This 
attached to the auxiliary verb do before the main verb see. With this construction she 
conveys uncertainty about what is contained in the complement clause where this is 
getting you referring to the prospects of the job. The relative adverb where refers to a 
geographical location andmetaphorically extends to prospects of a future career referred 
to with this. It functions as an agent while Julianne is patient of the metaphorical 
movement. Thereby Mom constructs the abstract meaning of a job with future prospects 
that she is unaware of. The second stance she creates is one towards Julianne’s future 
plans in an incomplete TCU. She uses the interrogative determiner what to modify it. 
Jointly the construction enquires about additional information. These appear before the 
copula is. The complement clause that you wanna do is incomplete but is arguably 
meant to refer to Julianne’s future plans.  
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Julianne aligns using a negative format creating a negative epistemic stance (line 44). 
Thus she confirms Moms’ observation and indicates having no knowledge of what she 
wants to do and thereby she confirms what Mom has said prior. The TCU is completed 
with the interrogative okay which points to Mom for confirmation. This is additionally 
supported by it having a rising intonation at the end. However no response is given 
immediately following which can be observed in the 0.4-second pause following. She 
then produces an interrogatively formatted claim of affect followed by a repeat of her 
negative epistemic stance (lines 46-47). It is interrogatively formatted by means of the 
auxiliary verb do being moved in front of the subject which is the second person 
singular pronoun you referring to Mom. The main verb is know. It refers to Mom’s 
knowledge of how panicked I get over that. How is placed before the affective term 
panicked. This construction refers to the amount of panic she experiences. She refers to 
herself using the pronoun I. A link is established between the affective term and the 
pronoun with the copula get. The prepositional phrase over that refers to her not 
knowing what her future plans are or what she wants to do.  
 As it can be seen from Mom’s response, she is not following Julianne’s 
projected turn of conversational events. She initiates her TCU partly in overlap with 
well which prior researchers have argued displays an orientation to the response not 
adhering to the format projected by the question (Schegloff & Lerner, 2009). She then 
produces I’m also disappointed that you get panicked over that. This is a claim of affect 
utilising the affective term disappointed. She attributes this to herself. The thing she is 
panicked over is contained in the adjectival complement clause that you get panicked 
over that. This recycles linguistic elements from Julianne’s prior turn. The cause 
follows which can be paraphrased as because I don’t think that’s at all called for. With 
this cause, she implies that Julianne’s claim of affect is not justifiable. This is achieved 
by creating a negative stance using the contracted negative adverb –n’t attached to the 
auxiliary verb do. This is followed by the main verb think which arguably implies that it 
is Mom’s conviction that it is not called for. The conviction is contained within the 
complement clause that’s at all called for. That is used as a pronoun referring to 
Julianne’s claimed affectivity. The verb phrase consists of the contracted copula –‘s and 
the main verb called which takes the preposition for. The grammatical analysis is 
slightly awkward due to at all being inserted into the verb phrase for additional 
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emphasis. The verb construction called for implies that something is needed. Seeing as 
the main clause creates the negative stance, Mom conveys that the affectivity Julianne 
claims is not needed or justifiable in the context.  
 This fragment is the only one there is of dispreferred disalignment to a claim. It 
provides the strongest case for affectivity being dependent on appropriateness. It also 
shows that Mom orients towards Julianne’s claim not as illusive and belonging to her 
psychological state. Rather she supposes that it is a social object she is allowed to 
handle. She does this from her vantage point and thus indicates that it is her stance and 
conviction. The claim of affect that Julianne produces is not viable in her optics. More 
importantly this extract shows that conversationalists show little apprehension towards 
commenting and presenting their views on how their conversational partners feel. Mom 
does not convey that she assumes Julianne is not in a state of panic. She indicates no 
orientation towards the truth-value of the affective state. As it can be seen, she assumes 
that Julianne is panicked because she produces a claim of affect where she establishes 
that she is disappointed in Julianne for being panicky about it. Thereby she is not in 
accordance with Mom’s view. Julianne’s claim of affect is neither designed to suggest 
the existence of an affective state. In fact it is designed to orient Mom towards her 
affectivity. In a way it assumes that Mom should be aware of her reaction. This is so 
because it is interrogatively formatted and orients towards Mom’s knowledge. Thus 
there are no indications from either of the conversationalists that the panic Julianne 
claims is not genuine.  
 These fragments show that conversationalists make public their affectivity to 
achieve various conversational goals. In Julianne’s case she orients Mom towards her 
affectivity with regards to the topic and thereby implies that not having any future plans 
has an affective cause. This suggests that affectivity is a social construct and socially 
managed by conversationalists through language. Julianne brings her affectivity into the 
conversation and orients her conversational partner towards it.  
 That they are socially construed means that they are a product of human social 
life. Take the case of Deborah who had an affair with a married man. She conveys a 
feeling of guilt which is the result of this affair. Thus she conveys awareness of her 
culpability. In her attempt to manage this guilt she uses language in interaction to 
portray herself as more of a victim than a culprit. In order to truly manage the guilt 
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feeling she needs confirmation from a third party that this is so. This she achieves from 
Sarah ultimately. As already stated she must rely on language to achieve this which this 
chapter has shown with analyses of multiple fragments containing claims of affect.  
5.3 Conclusion 
In sum it has analysed and discussed the interactional functions and implications of 
claims of affect and how second speakers respond them to. Two sequential locations 
have been investigated. The first is that of pre-cause claims of affect. Interlocutors use 
these to attain an opportunity to talk about the cause. If a cause is not immediately 
presented, second speakers will orient towards this fact. The other sequential 
environment is post-cause claims of affect. Typically these are designed to elicit 
alignment from second speakers. Only one instance was found of a claim being used to 
elicit disalignment (see fragments 5.2.2.2 and 5.2.2.3). Here the conversationalist was 
managing her guilt feeling by negotiating it with her conversational partner. Only a few 
instances have been found of disalignment to claims designed to elicit alignment. In 
only one case is this done explicitly.  
 These findings suggest that affectivity is a public phenomenon which both 
interlocutors orient to as negotiable. This is contrary to the previous assumption that 
affectivity and emotion are intrinsically personal and private to the individual. Indeed 
these fragments have shown that emotionality is as much a product of social interaction 
as it is of potential brain activity or individual psychology. This is astounding in the 
way that people do not view the affectivity of others as being out of bounds. Instead 
they rather see it as a concrete social object that they can take in their hands and deal 
with through language and interaction. The claimer may actively pursue an aligning 
response to conclude that she is feeling in the right manner or a disaligning response 
that she should not feel bad about something. On the other hand the second speaker can 
either confirm that the claim is genuinely justifiable or that the affective response is 
unwarranted by the situation. These findings suggest that affectivity and emotion are 
intrinsically social and that they can be interactionally managed and negotiated.  
6 Conclusion and further studies 
This study has investigated a phenomenon called “claims of affect”. These are linguistic 
expressions that conversationalists utilise for making their affectivity public. This is 
61 
done to achieve conversational goals and to let their conversational partners across the 
doorstep into their emotional lives. Their linguistic designs have been shown to be 
versatile. Yet two general formats are commonly found. For example, the claimer can 
refer to herself with the pronoun I. She can also use the third person singular pronoun it 
to refer to a larger context. This pronoun has been shown not refer to one referent. 
Rather it encompasses multiple and larger, abstract referents. With regards to verbs, 
claims rely heavily on copular verbs except for claims that rely on other features such as 
inference. The copular verb creates an attributive link between the predicate and the 
subject. The predicate is usually an adjective with affective value. It has therefore been 
coined “the affective term”. An adjective can either refer directly to an affective state 
such as being depressed. However, numerous instances have been found of adjectives 
that are used metaphorically such as for example hard. A few claims of affect do not 
rely on these features. Rather they rely on inferences to be made by the second speaker.  
 Sequentially claims have been found in two positions. The first is “pre-cause 
claims of affect” which appear before the cause is presented. The second is “post-cause 
claims of affect”. What the claims achieve conversationally and interactionally in each 
position is different. Pre-cause claims are designed to evoke an opportunity for talking 
about the cause. This was shown to be the case because second speakers orient to the 
cause as missing if it is not produced immediately after. The function of post-cause 
claims of affect is to elicit either an aligning or disaligning response from the second 
speaker. The question of which is produced depends on preference organisation. In the 
majority of cases, the claim prefers an aligning response. In only one instance is 
disalignment the preferred response to the claim of affect. As stated this is dependent on 
preference organisation. It is achieved by the activity designed to successfully reach a 
particular goal.  In the case investigated here, the claimer sought to have her affective 
response disconfirmed in order not to feel guilty. Dispreferred disalignment has also 
been observed. No instances of dispreffered alignment have been found yet. 
 Both pre-and post-cause claims of affect have functions that point towards 
affectivity as being a highly social object. As has been shown the case is that emotion 
takes an object which is the cause. With pre-cause claims the claimer makes public an 
emotion which consequently enforces this relationship between cause and emotion. This 
also means that if a cause is not provided, then second speakers will begin to look for it. 
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When it comes to post-cause claims of affect, they have been shown to elicit a response 
from the second speaker that either confirms or denies the claimer’s emotionality. This 
confirmation is always based on the appropriateness of the causative link between the 
cause and the affective reaction. The cause can be too weak and the affective reaction 
can be too strong. Therefore it can ultimately result in a dispreferred response. 
 A claim of affect is produced to achieve some goal in the conversation. For 
example, a conversationalist may want to deal with guilt and is therefore looking to 
another conversationalist to do so. It may be that the conversationalist wants 
reassurance. He or she is therefore accounting for causative circumstances and the 
affective reaction. In doing so the conversationalist obliges his or her conversational 
partner to respond. This means that claimers look towards their conversational partners 
for indications of how they should feel. 
 Another finding has been that speakers claim access to each others emotions 
presented with a claim of affect. These responses are aligning and done empathetically. 
The empathetic response is done with reference to similar experience. When done with 
reference to similar experience one potential outcome is a topically related second story.  
 All in all this analysis points towards affectivity as being not an abstract 
psychological phenomenon isolated to the individual or the brain. Instead it is a strongly 
present factor in everyday social interaction. It is negotiated through linguistic means in 
interaction. Thus where prior researchers have suggested that emotion is a private, 
unobservable and psychological phenomenon (cf. Heritage, 2008), this study has shown 
that conversationalists do not necessarily view it in the same manner when it comes to 
claims of affect. Both speakers treat these as conveying the affective state of the 
speaker. On occasion, however, they can be seen as unjust in the eyes of the second 
speakers if the causative link is considered invalid. Thereby the claimer is claiming too 
much.  
 Some aspects of claims of affect still remain to be studied to provide a better 
understanding of this phenomenon. The present study has been unable to deal with these 
due to time constraints. Researchers have argued that phonetic features are responsible 
for sequential organisation. The question therefore remains to what extent the prosodic 
features of pre-and post-cause claims of affect work towards getting a particular type of 
response from the second speaker. This potential investigation could shed light on the 
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controversial issue of whether psychological states can be attributed to certain phonetic 
features or not. Claims of affect are a prime target for this investigation as they indicate 
affectivity at the lexical level which this study has shown both conversationalists orient 
towards. Thus if the phonetic features support the linguistic design of the claims of 
affect, there could be reason to suspect that they convey affective states. However the 
phonetic designs of the claims seem to be too disparate to generalise over. Some are 
produced noticeably louder than others and some are very quiet. Some seem flat 
whereas others vary in intonation. Researchers might find that these features work more 
towards organising sequence and play its part in achieving conversational goals which 
claims of affect have been shown to do.  
 Another endeavour, which this data is not large enough for, is gender studies. 
The majority of claims have been found in conversations between female speakers. One 
was found produced by a female speaker to a male and only one has been found 
produced by a male to another male. Investigating the linguistic design that women and 
men utilise when making claims of affect can show how the two genders go about 
talking about emotion. In the one example in this study of a male producing a claim, the 
claim itself is implied and relies heavily on inference. Whether this manner of using 
claims of affect is symptomatic for males remains to be investigated. 
Appdendix 
Cross-references  
Reference to the fragment’s location in the paper and in the corpora is indicated above 
each fragment (an example can be seen below). The numbers in the parentheses refers 
to the location in the paper. Everything that appears before the very last number refers 
to chapter, section, and subsection. The number appearing last indicate fragment 
number in that section or subsection. This number resets in each new chapter or section. 
Next appears an abbreviation referring to the CallFriend (CF) or the CallHome (CH) 
corpora. Then follows the name of the phone call, which is split into two parts. The first 
is the coded reference, which is a couple of letters and a number. In the above fragment, 
this is ENGS6269. The second is the name given to the conversation by the researcher. 
This is for ease of recollection and reference, as the name indicates what a given 
fragment in that conversation is about. The below fragment’s given name is GLANDS. 
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Last in the reference line is the time code, used for referring to its location in the audio 
file. This is indicated in minutes and seconds.  
 
(1.1) CH:EN_4092:YUCKY:13:23 
 
Definitions 
GAT 2 transcription conventions  
Type Symbol Explanation 
 
Sequential 
organisation 
  
 = Latching 
 [   ] 
[   ] 
Overlapping 
Pauses   
 (.) Micro pause, shorter than 0.2 sec. 
 (1.5) Measured pause 
Segmental units   
 : Symbol covers approximately 0.3 second of 
prolongation. Multiple symbols can be used for 
longer cases.   
In – or exhalation    
 °h / h° Symbol covers approximately 0.3 second of in-or 
exhalation. Multiple symbols can be used in 
conjunction for longer occurrences. 
Laughter/weeping   
 Hahah Laughter indication 
Accentuation   
 TRANscript Main stress 
 !TRAN!script Extra stress 
Segmentals   
 ʔ Glottal stop* 
Pitch movement at 
TCU end  
  
 ? Rising 
 , Mid rising 
 - Flat 
 . Falling 
New TCU   
 Transcript A capital letter at the beginning of a word and a 
TCU means a new TCU.  
Pitch register   
 <<h>    > High register 
 <<l>    > Low register 
Dynamics    
 <<f>    > Forte, loud 
 <<p>    > Piano, quiet/soft 
 <<all>  > Allegro, fast 
 <<len>  > Lento, slow 
Other   
 (      ) Incomprehensible  
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